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Labor market outlook in Panama

Global nuclear risk today: a Spanish
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Towards a sustainable blue economy
in Panama: challenges and
opportunities



**GOVERNMENTS ON THE LEFT:
keep gaining ground in Latin
America**

Economic and business
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Editorial

GOVERNMENTS ON THE LEFT: keep gaining ground in Latin America

A serene look at the Latin American map indicates with crystal clarity that from Mexico to Patagonia there is a prevalence of governments whose ideological orientation is left, including recently: Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Peru. In the same vein, the upcoming elections in Colombia, Chile and Brazil could offer voters an opportunity to choose a leader with tendencies who even sympathize with communist governments.

The presidential election held over the weekend in Honduras, has meant the rupture of a concentration of power during three presidential terms marked by a government alliance that has not solved the problems of corruption and drug trafficking and has led thousands of Hondurans to undertake a dangerous adventure walking to the United States to seek the "American dream".

Meanwhile in Chile, voters will have to decide between a vindication of the policies that are guided by the followers of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and the trends that marked the period of government of Salvador Allende.

In Colombia, former President Álvaro Uribe has just warned voters about the great possibilities that the candidate Gustavo Petro has of reaching the presidency of that country, in which case there would be a radical change in the political orientation of that government.

All this makes it necessary to ask ourselves in a timely manner about the reasons that drive the inhabitants of our countries to consider that their wishes and needs can be resolved by governments that represent a radical change in the management of the great needs that affect them. It is clear that there is a similarity in each of our nations.

All are marked by social inequality, which in very simple terms indicates that the vast majority lack the minimum elements to ensure their well-being, since as is the case in Panama, Panama City and Colón absorb more than 80% of the product. Gross domestic and indigenous communities live in an environment of misery.

Education: The disruption of educational systems amid the pandemic and school dropouts create second and third category citizens who have not had access to a relevant education.

Employment: Unemployment has increased notably and again there is talk of a lost decade in Latin America.

Crime and Drug Trafficking: Citizens feel totally helpless and the authorities haven't been able to develop concrete actions to combat these scourges.

Health: The pandemic has demonstrated the weakness of public prevention and disease programs and the collapse of social security entities.

When we observe this panorama from Panama, it is mandatory to take an introspective look to reflect, precisely in month of fatherland, where are we going?

Throughout these months, starting in March 2020, we have referred with concern to the fact that despite the abundant resources of public credit, the existence of a five-year government plan, the choice of a political party which holds a legislative majority, the country does not reflect a level of

citizen satisfaction based on the tasks committed as of July 2019, by the current administration.

Quite the contrary, without fear of being wrong, and the country does not have a positive perception of what the public administration has been up to now. It would be cumbersome to return to the issues that constitute the daily concerns of citizens.

Listing would also be inappropriate at this time.

Today closes a cycle of a popular consultation called "Closing Gaps" which in our opinion constitutes the last opportunity that Panamanian society as a whole has to avoid a social, political and economic cataclysm that places us in the same circuit of the governments of left.

At the same time, it is the last episode for the political forces to find unity, coherence and courage to put forward a proposal that restores self-esteem, hope, desire, and the decision to work to "finally achieve victory "within a deeply supportive, honest, civic system, open to innovation that favors education and work, that defeats narcopolitics, conflict of interest, play alive, concentration of power and apathy.

We have enough time to undertake this great national task and be reborn as the phoenix in the year 2024.

It will dawn and we will see...L&E

Invited Writer



LABOR MARKET OUTLOOK IN PANAMA

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In recent days the Chamber of Industries and Agriculture of Panama, held the customary Executive Meeting which had the participation, among others, of the Minister of Labor and Labor Development, who presented the issue of Labor Market Outlook in Panama, which was divided into three focal points and what are they:

1. Situation of the labor market in figures.
2. Strategies for economic reactivation of the National Government.
3. Actions from MITRADEL.

The Minister starts by pointing out that, for year 2019 population economically was approximately 1,920,642 people, for year 2020 there is a decrease in the figure and it is located at 1,631,91; However, an increase of approximately 23,431 people is observed for the year 2021, which places the figure at 1,655,122 employed persons.

Regarding the unemployed active economic population, we see that in 2019 it was 146,111, in 2020 it was 371,657 and by 2021 it was 281,634

people, which although number of unemployed fell to be at levels of 2019 they must employ 135,523 people.

She added that at the moment the unemployment rate is 14.5%, which corresponds to the 281,634 people indicated above, highlighting that since 2014 the unemployment rate has been gradually increasing.

In this vein, she referred to employment contracts, indicating that from January to October 2021 a total of 182,468 employment contracts have been registered, of which 47% correspond to defined ones, 25% to indefinite ones and 28% to specific works. Analyzing the employment contracts by region, it is observed that in the province of Panama the highest amount is observed with 58%, followed by the provinces of Chiriquí and Panama Oeste, then Coclé with 6%, so on.

She made reference to the suspension of employment contracts during the pandemic, indicating that 284,209 contracts with 20,876 processed companies were suspended and that as

of November 1, 2021, 100% of the contracts have been reactivated as shown in the following graph:

Once the suspended contracts were reactivated, there have been 29,499 terminations of the employment relationship, of which 13,244 have been by mutual agreement, 4,962 due to expiration of the agreed term, 2,935 due to conclusion of the work that is the object of the contract, 3,141 due to resignation of the worker, 5,201 due to dismissal and 16 due to death of the worker.

According to the economic growth projections of Panama for 2021, it presented the following:

Another of the issues addressed by the Minister was related to the economic reactivation strategy of National Government, which focused on five axes, namely:

1. Vaccination.
2. Support for micro, small and medium enterprises.
3. Public infrastructure projects.
4. Attraction of tourism.
5. Creation of new free zones.

Finally, she presented the actions from MITRADEL highlighting:

1. One-stop shop for opportunities which from July to June 2021 has attended 360 users and plans to serve 850 by 2022.
2. Learning by doing project, which as of October 2021 has signed an agreement for 100 internships with the company Arcos Dorados, S.A. and 401 young people have been trained in soft skills for life and work.
3. Project to support job placement that has benefited 102 workers and is projected by 2022 to insert 181 people into the job market.

4. Program to improve the employment of people with disabilities, achieving the insertion of 162 people to date.

5. "Community employability" line of action, which as of October 2021 has achieved the insertion of 1,373 people in the construction sector.

6. Panama employment platform and labor intermediaries producing 1,585 job insertions, through procedures carried out by MITRADEL, by job placement agencies and by the Regional Directorates.

7. Line of action changing lives.

8. Public policy of employability and labor insertion of young women and women in conditions of socioeconomic vulnerability in Panama.

Taking into account that we are waiting for the setting of a new minimum wage, the Minister referred to the issue, indicating that courtesy meetings have been held with the various sectors in the provinces of Chiriquí, Bocas del Toro, Coclé, Veraguas, Los Santos and Herrera and that in the next ordinary meetings of the Minimum Wage Commission the minimum wage and the relationship between prices, poverty and economic evolution of the country and the labor market will be reviewed.

She concluded by pointing out that she is a believer in tripartite dialogue and that she hopes that a consensus can be reached with productive sectors of the country. *L&E*



CONTRATOS DE TRABAJO AÑO 2021 – POR REGIÓN

Provincia	Cantidad de contratos	% por provincia del total
Panamá	106,001	58%
Bocas del Toro	2,954	2%
Coclé	11,554	6%
Colón	10,031	5%
Chiriquí	18,851	10%
Darién	570	0%
Herrera	4,930	3%
Los Santos	2,352	1%
Panamá Oeste	18,022	10%
Veraguas	7,203	4%

Fuente: Dirección de Planificación, Departamento de Estadística, Ministerio de Trabajo y Desarrollo Laboral.
(p): cifras preliminares.

SUSPENSIONES DE CONTRATOS DURANTE LA PANDEMIA POR COVID-19

CONTRATOS SUSPENDIDOS	284,209
EMPRESAS PROCESADAS	20,876
% DE REACTIVACIÓN AL 1 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2021	100%



Fuente: Dirección de Planificación, Departamento de Estadística, Ministerio de Trabajo y Desarrollo Laboral.

PROYECCIONES DE CRECIMIENTO ECONÓMICO DE PANAMÁ PARA 2021

Institución	Proyección (%)
Cámara de Comercio de Panamá	13.8
FMI	12.0
Banco Mundial	9.9
Fitch	12.1
S&P	9.0
CEPAL	12.0
BOFA	9.5
The Economist	11.0
Moody	8.0 – 10.0
Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas	9.0



123/2021

4 de noviembre de 2021

Ana Aguilera*

El riesgo nuclear global en la actualidad: una perspectiva española

El riesgo nuclear global en la actualidad: una perspectiva española

Resumen:

El mundo está asistiendo a un momento de deconstrucción del orden nuclear global. El régimen de no proliferación vigente desde que entrara en vigor el Tratado sobre la No Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares de 1968, piedra angular en legislación internacional sobre la mayor arma de destrucción masiva, ha sido testigo de fuertes cambios, deterioros y falta de entendimiento entre las grandes potencias nucleares del momento.

Este documento analiza los diferentes retos, amenazas y desafíos que influyen en la actual tensión nuclear y la vuelta a la competencia global en las relaciones internacionales en torno a la proliferación del arma nuclear. Este análisis se ha realizado desde una perspectiva española, un punto de vista relativamente poco tratado en escuelas o centros de investigación nacionales que podría arrojar algo de luz para la comprensión general sobre los actuales riesgos.

Palabras clave:

Desafío nuclear, no proliferación, seguridad nacional, TNP, desarme.

*NOTA: Las ideas contenidas en los Documentos de Opinión son responsabilidad de sus autores, sin que reflejen necesariamente el pensamiento del IEEE o del Ministerio de Defensa.

The current global nuclear challenges: a Spanish perspective

Abstract:

The world is witnessing a moment of deconstruction in the global nuclear order. The non-proliferation regime in force since the entry into force of the 1968 Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the cornerstone of international legislation on the greatest weapon of mass destruction, has witnessed major changes, deterioration, and lack of understanding among the major nuclear powers of the time.

This document examines the different challenges, threats and issues that influence the current nuclear tension and the return to global competition in international relations over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This analysis has been carried out from a Spanish perspective, a point of view that is relatively unaddressed in national schools and research centres, which could shed some light on the general understanding of the current risks at the national level.

Keywords:

Nuclear challenges, non-proliferation, National security, NPT, disarmament

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https://www.ieeee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2021/DIEEEO123_2021_ANAAGU_Riesgo.pdf y/o [enlace bie³](#) (consultado día/mes/año)

Introducción

Desde que el arma nuclear fuera desarrollada con éxito en el marco de los planes y programas militares de algunas de las principales potencias del mundo, su uso o la amenaza de usarla ha traído consigo una fuente incesante de conflictos, dilemas y tensiones diplomáticas por una gran variedad de motivaciones e intereses contrapuestos.

El mundo asiste en la actualidad a un momento de deconstrucción del orden internacional y profunda transformación geopolítica, donde los actores a todos los niveles están siendo testigos de una menor gestión y capacidad de control de armamentos nucleares. Las actuales potencias nucleares están dinamitando los esfuerzos por conseguir un progresivo desarme, cuyas hostilidades y parálisis en la búsqueda de la distensión a nivel diplomático albergan consecuencias altamente negativas tanto para los Estados nucleares como para el resto de países desnuclearizados que componen el ecosistema internacional vigente.

Breve contextualización

Desde los años 1960, los dos hegemones globales del orden bipolar, Estados Unidos y la entonces Unión Soviética, a raíz de un largo historial de tensiones nucleares, se comprometieron a buscar una progresiva desescalada de sus respectivos armamentos a través de mecanismos regulatorios bilaterales. Sin embargo, mientras ambas potencias negociaban los términos y condiciones de los desmantelamientos de sus respectivos arsenales, otros países entraban en el selectivo club nuclear.

Actuando como dique de contención para el progreso de futuros programas militares, en 1970 entró en vigor el Tratado sobre la No Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares (TNP). Los tres pilares fundamentales del TNP se basaban en la no transferencia de tecnología a otros países por parte de las potencias nucleares, el compromiso de no adquirir armas nucleares por parte de los que no las poseían, y un uso pacífico de la energía nuclear.

El TNP contemplaba asimismo el progresivo desarme de aquellos países que estuvieran en posesión del arma nuclear con anterioridad al 1 de enero de 1967 y, por tanto, con su derecho de posesión: Estados Unidos, la Unión Soviética, Francia, Reino Unido y China¹.

Estos Estados se comprometían a no acceder a este arma, promover el progresivo desmantelamiento y hacer un uso pacífico de la energía nuclear concertado a través de acuerdos de salvaguardias amplias, el sistema de verificación del Organismo Internacional de la Energía Atómica (OIEA) en connivencia con lo establecido en el TNP.

No obstante, posteriormente otras potencias testaron con éxito sus respectivos programas nucleares: Pakistán (1998), India (1974) y Corea del Norte (2006), los cuales han tomado caminos diversos con relación al TNP. Por su parte, la decisión de Israel de establecer una doctrina de opacidad en la cuestión nuclear evita que este documento la declare un Estado nuclearizado más.

Por tanto, y a pesar de que este tratado es hoy en día la piedra angular sobre la cual se rigen la mayor parte de los esfuerzos en las cuestiones sobre la no proliferación nuclear, con 191 países adheridos, existen algunos elementos que limitan el ámbito de su aplicación, contribuyendo a que el régimen actual de no proliferación capitalizado por el TNP se encuentre en una compleja disyuntiva.

Principales desafíos al marco regulatorio internacional en las cuestiones de no proliferación

El primer factor es el freno en los avances para universalizar el alcance de este tratado². Por su parte, Pakistán e India no son Estados signatarios del tratado, mientras que Corea del Norte lo abandonó en el año 2003³. Con respecto a otros mecanismos de legislación nuclear que complementan el marco regulatorio entre las dos principales potencias nucleares, Rusia y Estados Unidos, existe asimismo un deterioro o extinción de estos, especialmente el abandono estadounidense del Tratado sobre Misiles Antibalísticos (tratado ABM, por sus siglas en inglés) hace casi dos décadas o la extinción del Tratado sobre Fuerzas Nucleares de Rango Intermedio (tratado INF por sus siglas en inglés) en

¹ OIEA. *El Tratado sobre la No Proliferación de Armas Nucleares*, 1968, p. 6. Disponible en: https://www.oica.org/bitca/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140_sp.pdf

² GARCÍA, María del Mar et al. "La no proliferación y el control de armamentos nucleares en la encrucijada", *Quaderno de Estrategia* 205. Ministerio de Defensa, 2020, p. 229.

³ Ídem, p. 228.

2019⁴. La conferencia de revisión del TNP, prevista para el año 2021, tampoco parece tener mejor porvenir que el resto, y otros mecanismos que influyen en el régimen de no proliferación como el Tratado de Prohibición Completa de Ensayos Nucleares (TPCEN) aún no han podido entrar en vigor.

En segundo lugar, a la actual realidad nuclear se le suma el factor revisionista: una lógica de ciertos países que usan la baza nuclear como instrumento de presión y poder para perseguir sus intereses y revertir el orden internacional. El caso de Corea del Norte es el escenario más llamativo, trabajando en su programa de misiles balísticos como herramienta de extorsión frente a sus adversarios. India y Pakistán, por su parte, han usado similarmente sus programas nucleares como herramienta de disuasión mutua, mientras que Israel acusa a Irán de explorar su propio programa militar, acusación que el último desmiente⁵.

El tercer elemento de tensión nuclear es la reconfiguración del marco que regula el actual régimen de no proliferación. El TNP ha asistido a la irrupción de foros, plataformas y mecanismos que buscan el desmantelamiento completo de las armas nucleares, quebrando el *statu quo* existente en la configuración jurídica internacional. El Tratado sobre la Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares (TPAN), tras la ratificación número 50, ha entrado en vigor en enero de 2021. Sin embargo, los países nucleares no han ratificado el tratado, por lo que no resulta vinculante para ellos. Tampoco lo han ratificado los miembros de la UE (con la excepción de Austria), pues les impediría conocer ciertos planes de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN) con relación a las armas nucleares, y el TPAN no aporta nuevas obligaciones más allá de las reconocidas y cumplidas a través del TNP⁶. Por otro lado, que sea una iniciativa de países no nucleares aleja las negociaciones de las potencias nucleares sobre reducir progresivamente sus arsenales nucleares y balísticos en función de su percepción del riesgo e inutiliza los progresos negociadores al margen de este mecanismo. De hecho, la reducción de armamento nuclear implica una irrupción en la fabricación de los arsenales e inhabilitar parte de los existentes, evitando así una posterior proliferación, mientras que el desarme nuclear contempla una eventual eliminación completa, algo que

⁴ CASTRO, José Ignacio. *El tratado New START: contener al elefante negro*. Documento de Análisis IEEE 02/2021, 2021, p. 3.

⁵ FEDERMAN, Josef. "On Holocaust Day, Netanyahu issues warning about Iran", *AP News*, 2021. Disponible en: <https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-iran-nuclear-nuclear-weapon-coronavirus-pandemic-9d16f68453b340d06cf21c210da3c868>

⁶ Entrevista al Cnel. José Ignacio Castro Torres, analista del IEEE. Madrid, abril 2021.

en la práctica resulta inviable de implementar. Por tanto, el TPN ha terminado por ser un tratado con un camino empedrado de buenas intenciones, pero inoperante, al mezclar cuestiones muy diferentes entre ellas como son la no proliferación, el desarme y la reducción de armamentos.

En vista de estos tres factores se entiende que existen brechas de confianza entre los Estados nucleares, así como entre los Estados nucleares y el resto de Estados no nuclearizados. A ello hay que añadirle los posibles futuros miembros del club nuclear, como Irán, o aquellos otros que lo exploran activamente, como Corea del Norte.

Por lo anterior, es deducible pensar que el desarme internacional sea en realidad una quimera. Los países poseen el arma nuclear por razones ligadas a su seguridad, y la disminución de la proliferación se ha tratado de consensuar de forma gradual y unilateral a merced de la voluntad de los Estados. En vista de los recientes obstáculos en torno al TNP, conseguir avances bajo el amparo de este marco a nivel global se convierte en el principal desafío en el sistema legal de la no proliferación nuclear.

Riesgos asociados al régimen actual de no proliferación: un replanteamiento nuclear en las actuales relaciones internacionales

En un contexto con un equilibrio de poderes bastante cambiante y dinámico, resulta necesario evaluar los desafíos por parte de los principales actores involucrados en la toma de decisiones que afectan a la proliferación nuclear en el mundo.

El Grupo de los P5 (+1)

El Grupo de los P5 responde a los cinco Estados nucleares que cuentan con poder de veto en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas: Estados Unidos, Rusia, China, Reino Unido y Francia, países que junto a la UE unieron sus fuerzas diplomáticas frente a Irán en el año 2006 en vista del creciente desarrollo de su programa nuclear.

Principalmente, la pertenencia a la alianza militar de la OTAN por parte de Estados Unidos, Francia y Reino Unido, que también se reconoce como una alianza nuclear, hace que estos países no se comprendan como una amenaza directa al régimen de no proliferación desde una perspectiva española.

Sin embargo, si desglosamos el análisis de riesgos en nuestro vecindario regional, lo cierto es que el teatro europeo no queda fuera de las discrepancias y tensiones políticas. En el caso de la Unión Europea (UE), existen limitaciones en cuanto a margen de maniobra al no disponer de una estrategia nuclear institucionalizada en lo que respecta a su postura diplomática frente a otros actores nucleares, demostrado especialmente en el caso de Irán. A nivel interno, el continente es un escenario constante de presiones en torno a esta cuestión: Francia, el único miembro nuclearizado y con capacidades nucleares propias destinadas a la seguridad colectiva del continente, es un firme defensor de la conocida Autonomía Estratégica y de una disuasión nuclear europea que otros Estados miembros se encuentran reticentes a abordar⁷. Esta falta de unidad interna en la cultura estratégica europea implica que, ante una mayor escalada de hostilidades con otros actores en el tablero político nuclear, se puedan incrementar las discrepancias en el seno de la UE sobre cómo actuar y sobre hasta qué punto depender del ámbito de actuación de la OTAN, terminando por relegar a la UE a un actor poco decisivo en el panorama actual.

Otro de los retos lo presenta la otra potencia nuclear en Europa Occidental, Reino Unido, que ha anunciado recientemente ampliar su techo nuclear en un 40 % y reducir la transparencia de sus capacidades reales, evidenciando que se está recalculando su actual doctrina. Este replanteamiento estratégico en la era post-Brexit indica una mayor coordinación con su socio estadounidense, asignando sus fuerzas a las de la OTAN —a diferencia de las francesas—, pero también una opacidad británica fruto de un orden nuclear todavía más caótico e impredecible que trae como consecuencia que la capacidad de respuesta europea frente a un actor hostil está menos cohesionada que décadas atrás⁸. Similarmente, ciertos países no nucleares cuentan con armas nucleares estadounidenses asentadas en sus territorios, como es el caso de Alemania⁹, Bélgica o Turquía, con aeronaves de doble capacidad en el marco de la estrategia de disuasión

⁷ "Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy", *Official Website of the President of France*, 2020. Disponible en: <https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy>

⁸ "New UK Defense Strategy A Troubling Step Back on Nuclear Policy", *Arms Control Association*, 2021. Disponible en: <https://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2021-03/new-uk-defense-strategy-troubling-step-back-nuclear-policy>

⁹ En 2020 hubo un debate en Alemania sobre la posibilidad de sustituir su flota de aviones Tomado, algunos de ellos compatibles con armas nucleares estadounidenses, y cómo hacerlo. Disponible en: <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-08/news/german-politicians-renew-nuclear-basing-debate>

nuclear de la OTAN¹⁰, por lo que Europa Occidental se presenta como un espacio con dos únicos actores nucleares, pero con una gran base nuclear asentada entre las dos potencias nucleares más fuertes del momento.

El orden nuclear desde la perspectiva europea no vive su mayor apogeo actualmente. Parte de la UE se cuestiona relegar su seguridad a su socio trasatlántico, pero no consigue unificar una postura firme y sólida tanto a nivel doméstico sobre cómo responder a los replanteamientos estratégicos en el interior del continente como a nivel externo sobre el curso de acción en lo que concierne a los programas nucleares de aplicación militar. Por ello, se encuentran recalculando su plan de acción frente a los retos y desafíos que están y los que quedan por venir en la arquitectura de la no proliferación. Que su decisión llegue al ritmo de los acontecimientos es ya otra cuestión que escapa al ámbito del presente documento.

Por parte de Estados Unidos, su última Postura Nuclear de 2018 bajo la administración Trump tomó unos tintes más asertivos y se optó por rechazar la posible incorporación de la doctrina de «no usar primero» (*no first use policy*), contemplando así el uso de la opción nuclear en amenazas no nucleares¹¹. La no renovación de su Postura Nuclear, asimismo, supone abrir nuevos frentes en la escalada de tensiones, algo que de momento se ha visto menguado tras la renovación del tratado NEW START entre Moscú y Washington por cinco años más en enero de 2021.

Para entender la estrategia estadounidense, es necesario poner el foco en su posición actual. Estados Unidos desea incluir a China en el control de su capacidad nuclear para contener el modernizado programa militar del gigante asiático y que las relaciones entre las principales potencias rivales queden supeditadas a un equilibrio de poderes para preservar el *statu quo*. Sin embargo, Rusia no contempla a su homólogo asiático como una principal amenaza a sus intereses en la esfera nuclear (por el momento solo es potencial). La estrategia nuclear rusa, por el contrario, busca mermar la hegemonía regional americana en la zona Asia-Pacífico manteniéndose al margen de la incorporación china en las negociaciones sobre el control de armamento, mientras que Pekín busca estar a la altura tanto de Washington como de Moscú.

¹⁰ 'NATO's nuclear deterrence policy and forces', OTAN, 2020. Disponible en: https://www.nato.int/csp/en/nato/hq/topics_50068.htm

¹¹ FRIAS, Carlos Javier et al. 'La no proliferación y el control de armamentos nucleares en la encrucijada', *Cuaderno de Estrategia* 205. Ministerio de Defensa, 2020, p. 41.

En el caso de la Federación Rusa, el arma nuclear ha constituido su principal método de disuasión en la rivalidad que mantiene con Estados Unidos desde la Guerra Fría. En la actualidad, su principal amenaza al oeste la presentan los lanzadores MK-41 en construcción en Rumania y Polonia¹², que además no cuentan con regulación internacional actualmente por la extinción del tratado INF. En el flanco sur y este, aunque sin ser confirmado públicamente por Moscú, la modernización de armamento nuclear de China, India e Irán supone similarmente una amenaza percibida en la evaluación de riesgos acorde a la visión rusa. Por ello, en 2020, Rusia publicó su estrategia nuclear por primera vez en la historia, centrada en las doctrinas de disuasión y contención nuclear¹³. Dicha postura sigue el pensamiento político de Primakov y su rechazo a la unipolaridad de Estados Unidos, a la que en su lugar la sustituye por una multipolaridad que ejercería sistémicamente un rol de control y contrapeso y mantendría contenida la amenaza tanto de aliados coyunturales como de rivales históricos. Así, extendiendo la capacidad disuasoria también a otros países como Reino Unido o Francia, Rusia tiene su armamento modernizado desde 2018, año en el que el Tratado New START le obligaba a ajustar su techo de armamentos estratégicos a las 1500 armas¹⁴.

El caso de la República Popular China (RPC) es similar al ruso, pues su programa nuclear gira en torno a una doctrina de disuasión frente al desafío estadounidense en el mar de la China meridional, convirtiendo este espacio en el teatro de operaciones en caso de una eventual escalada de tensiones. Sin embargo, los frentes abiertos de Pekín no responden únicamente al desafío regional norteamericano en Asia Pacífico, pues también existen otros rivales como India y la disputa territorial mutua en la zona del Himalaya, lo cual supondría incluso un teatro de operaciones adicional en la dimensión nuclear¹⁵.

De hecho, esta pugna geopolítica con India, así como la guerra comercial y tecnológica con Washington, están promoviendo una postura más asertiva del gigante asiático, por

¹² "Deployment of US Mk 41 missile systems in Romania, Poland contradicts INF Treaty", *Army Recognition*. Disponible en: <https://www.armyrecognition.com/october-2018-global-defense-security/army-news/industry/deployment-of-us-mk-41-missile-systems-in-romania-poland-contradicts-inf-treaty.html>

¹³ "Decreto del Presidente de la Federación de Rusia de fecha 02.06.2020 No. 355", *Gobierno de la Federación Rusa*, 2020. Disponible en: <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/45562>

¹⁴ FFRUAS, Carlos Javier et al. "La no proliferación y el control de armamentos nucleares en la encrucijada", *Guademo de Estrategia 205*. Ministerio de Defensa, 2020, p. 25.

¹⁵ KULACKI, Gregory. "Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First in a War With the United States?", *The Diplomat*, 2020. Disponible en: <https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/>

lo que su líder enfatiza la necesidad de establecer una «disuasión de alto nivel estratégico» que potenciaría las innovaciones tecnológicas en el músculo militar chino¹⁶. Previsiblemente China continuará desarrollando su industria nuclear militar en los años venideros, al margen de los tratados bilaterales entre Estados Unidos y Rusia, con una ausencia de negociación entre las grandes potencias que comprende consecuencias negativas en el terreno de seguridad por la percepción de hostilidad e inseguridad generalizadas y diplomático por la falta de entendimiento y desconfianza mutuas.

Su documento más reciente del año 2019 titulado *La Defensa Nacional de China en la Nueva Era* (el Libro Blanco), reafirmaba la postura de China sobre su doctrina de «no usar primero» la opción nuclear bajo cualquier circunstancia, así como contra cualquier Estado no nuclear¹⁷. Sin embargo, los misiles que la RPC tenía desmantelados se están alojando en silos¹⁸, por lo que se abre la posibilidad de que se plantee implementar el método *launch on warning*¹⁹. La dotación de submarinos con capacidades nuclear y el desarrollo de un modelo de bombardero estratégico, además, son avances en un programa nuclear militar del que antes no disponía, en un escenario revisionista que vaticina un cambio de actitud chino bastante alarmante para el ambiente de hostilidad nuclear actual. Los cambios de enfoque y reorientaciones en las conversaciones sinoestadounidenses muestran una frágil capacidad de entendimiento mutuo, manifestado recientemente en la reunión bilateral en Alaska, donde se emplearon inesperadamente términos poco diplomáticos no solo por la parte estadounidense sino también por la china²⁰. Este hecho vaticina un comportamiento más agresivo y desafiante de esta última potencia, quien está poniendo gran énfasis en mostrar que las reglas del tablero global ya no están alineadas con las que exige Occidente.

¹⁶ WONG, Catherine. "Xi Jinping tells China's military 'be prepared to respond' in unstable times", *South China Morning Post*, 2021. Disponible en: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3124733/xi-jinping-tells-chinas-military-be-prepared-respond-unstable>

¹⁷ "El Libro Blanco de la República Popular de China sobre la Defensa Nacional en la nueva era 2019", *DSN*, 2019. Disponible en: <https://www.dsn.gob.es/es/actualidad/sala-prensa/libro-blanco-rep%C3%BAblica-popular-china-sobre-defensa-nacional-nueva-era-2019>

¹⁸ KORDA, Matt y KRISTENSEN, Hans. "China Is Building A Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field", *Federation of American Scientists*, 2021. Disponible en: <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/07/china-is-building-a-second-nuclear-missile-silo-field/>

¹⁹ El *launch on warning* es una estrategia militar que permitiría atacar con represalias al enemigo en caso de un aviso de ataque nuclear antes incluso de que este llegue a producirse

²⁰ TOOSI, Nahal. "China and U.S. open Alaska meeting with undiplomatic war of words", *Político*, 2021. Disponible en: <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/18/china-us-alaska-meeting-undiplomatic-477118>

India y Pakistán

El contexto subregional de actual tensión entre Pakistán e India constituye uno de los principales retos al régimen de no proliferación nuclear, por su alta volatilidad y su carácter imprevisible²¹. Los dos tienen armas nucleares *de facto*, así como un largo historial de proliferación de materiales fisibles de aplicación militar, y ninguno de ellos es firmante del TNP, por lo que el desarrollo nuclear ha sido rápido y eficaz y con relativo beneplácito por parte de la comunidad internacional durante los últimos años²².

Ambos países se encuentran en una situación de mutua desconfianza y girando en torno a un dilema de seguridad perpetuo²³. Aunque la fórmula disuasoria ha sido históricamente frágil pero efectiva entre ambas potencias, un aumento de la tensión en torno a sus disputas territoriales en torno a la región de Cachemira pone en riesgo constante la seguridad regional del subcontinente asiático. La lógica pakistani es esencialmente agresiva hacia la India²⁴, sin consideración alguna de la doctrina de no usar primero, mientras que India ha favorecido la proliferación de su arsenal nuclear estratégico por considerar la amenaza a su territorio desde una perspectiva más amplia, englobando tanto a Pakistán como a otros países de su alrededor, particularmente a China.

Pakistán ha desarrollado un programa de misiles tácticos con capacidades nucleares tan potente como exponencialmente continuado, con buena parte de la sociedad pakistani apoyando su programa nuclear, en un ecosistema de continua disputa por el poder entre el brazo militar y la rama civil que hace que los cálculos políticos estén sujetos a una volatilidad preocupante y dependiente de las circunstancias. Su involucración en el pasado en transferencia de conocimientos y material nuclear a grupos terroristas añade todavía un mayor reto al contexto pakistani, con serias dificultades a la hora de prevenir la radicalización islamista dentro de los poderes del Estado en la era post Zia-ul Haq²⁵.

²¹ Entrevista a D. Vicente Garrido, experto en asuntos de no proliferación nuclear, desarme y control de armamentos. Madrid, mayo 2021

²² Entrevista a D. Carlos Torres, ingeniero nuclear y consejero Técnico en asuntos nucleares. Madrid, 2020.

²³ El dilema de seguridad es la situación donde una parte, al desconocer los objetivos y capacidades reales del adversario, opta por seguir reforzando su propia seguridad, creando una percepción de inseguridad al contrario y haciendo que se retroalimente el ciclo.

²⁴ TORRES, Carlos et al (2020). "La no proliferación y el control de armamentos nucleares en la encrucijada", *Cuaderno de Estrategia 205*. Ministerio de Defensa, 2020, p. 159.

²⁵ "Pakistan's Islamization - before and after dictator Zia-ul Haq", *DW*. Disponible en: <https://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-islamization-before-and-after-dictator-zia-ul-haq/a-19480315>

Corea del Norte

Para Corea del Norte, la baza nuclear sirve como garantía final de su propia existencia, no solo de su integridad territorial sino para la supervivencia última del actual tipo de régimen bajo la dinastía Kim²⁶. Los objetivos perseguidos por la vía nuclear han buscado desde sus orígenes en los años 1950 conseguir la autosuficiencia nacional y poseer el arma nuclear como herramienta de disuasión frente a cualquier amenaza externa. Esta lógica esencialista, en su perspectiva más amplia, es considerada actualmente la mayor amenaza para la arquitectura global del régimen de no proliferación por su nivel de hermetismo y falta de transparencia²⁷.

Como la mayor parte de sus capacidades militares, la cantidad de arsenal nuclear y balístico del país asiático es considerado para el régimen secreto de Estado y no se puede determinar con certeza su capacidad nuclear. A esta falta de transparencia se le suma además el factor diplomático con el resto de la comunidad internacional. Las tensiones derivadas de los ensayos nucleares y de lanzamiento de misiles balísticos desde 2006 han provocado en numerosas ocasiones la preocupación e indignación de la comunidad internacional, quien a través del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU ha impuesto sanciones en 2009 (la Resolución 1874) y en 2016 (las Resoluciones 2270, 2321 y 2375) para tratar de dinamitar unos ensayos cada vez más avanzados²⁸.

Uno de los países más afectados por la proliferación unilateral norcoreana al margen del orden internacional vigente es Estados Unidos, cuyos intereses en la región asiática se exponen a la demostración de riesgo balístico norcoreano de penetrar en el sistema de defensa antimisiles estadounidense establecido en Corea del Sur y en la base militar de Guam. Con la administración Trump, el desafío nuclear norcoreano sufrió un proceso de relativo alivio culminando en la declaración de Panmunjom y la Cumbre de Singapur entre Kim Yong Un y Donald Trump en 2018, así como a la relativa ausencia de condena o aquiescencia del presidente estadounidense a los ensayos balísticos norcoreanos²⁹.

Sin embargo, la actual administración Biden se encuentra inmersa en una confrontación directa con Pyongyang debido a la presencia de capacidades nucleares

²⁶ GARRIDO, Vicente et al. "La no proliferación y el control de armamentos nucleares en la encrucijada", *Cuaderno de Estrategia* 205. Ministerio de Defensa, 2020. p. 71.

²⁷ *Idem*.

²⁸ *Idem*, pp. 78-83.

²⁹ *Idem*, p. 104.

estadounidenses en la región de Asia-Pacífico, así como por el estrecho canal de colaboración y despliegue de maniobras militares conjuntas con Corea del Sur y Japón³⁰

La amenaza más tácita la representa el deseo norcoreano de culminar su proyecto Hwasong-15, el misil balístico intercontinental con un alcance de hasta 13 000 km que llegaría casi a cualquier rincón del planeta³¹. Sin embargo, en términos prácticos, cualquier fracaso en la futura negociación bilateral entre Estados Unidos y Corea del Norte que pudiera resultar en nuevas sanciones comerciales al país asiático terminaría por usarse como herramienta de legitimación de esta imparable proliferación nuclear y balística, poniendo en grave aprieto a la estabilidad internacional, a la postura china a la hora de condenar las actuaciones norcoreanas y al aumento de las hostilidades nucleares que acabarían por traducirse en un deterioro de las conferencias sobre la renovación de tratados clave como el TNP.

Israel

La doctrina nuclear israelí, similar al caso norcoreano, ha estado ligada a una lógica esencialmente defensiva para asegurar su propia supervivencia en la región de Oriente Próximo, pero no se puede determinar con certeza las capacidades reales sobre su programa nuclear. Los incesantes conflictos y guerras con sus rivales regionales han justificado la búsqueda de su propio proyecto desde que el Estado fuera creado en 1948 y constituye la razón por la que hasta la actualidad sea reticente a adherirse al TNP³². Desde 1967, Israel ya contaba con el material suficiente para demostrar su músculo nuclear, pero trató de evitar ser el primer Estado en hacer una demostración de poder en Oriente Próximo y pasó de una postura de ambigüedad nuclear calculada a una doctrina de opacidad, también conocida como Postura Amimut³³.

Desde principios de los 1980, sus cálculos cambiaron, lanzando una nueva postura nuclear conocida como Doctrina Begin que buscaba dinamitar cualquier intento de desarrollo de capacidades nucleares militares por parte de actores hostiles contra

³⁰ JEONG, Andrew. "Biden Shifts Focus Back to U.S. Alliances in Japan, South Korea", *The Wall Street Journal*, 2021. Disponible en: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-shifts-focus-back-to-u-s-alliances-in-japan-south-korea-11615988407>

³¹ GARRIDO, Vicente et al. "La no proliferación y el control de armamentos nucleares en la encrucijada", *Cuaderno de Estrategia 205*. Ministerio de Defensa, 2020. p. 83.

³² *Idem*, 167.

³³ *Idem*, 172.

Israel³⁴. De hecho, ampararon su ofensiva contra instalaciones nucleares sirias en 2007 bajo esta doctrina, y el temor de la comunidad internacional desde entonces se ha condicionado en que Israel pretenda reproducir este movimiento contra Irán, país que viene explorando su fuerza nuclear desde antes de la Revolución Islámica de 1979.

La llegada de Trump a la Casa Blanca en 2017 supuso un alivio para Israel, pues el dirigente republicano contemplaba en su programa electoral abandonar el Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto (PAIC) con Irán, por lo que la relación con la actual administración estadounidense se augura más compleja por la predisposición de este último a retomar las negociaciones con Teherán.

Irán

El caso iraní constituye otro de los retos actuales para la credibilidad del régimen de no proliferación nuclear³⁵. La retirada estadounidense del PAIC entre Teherán y los P5+1 en 2018 provocó una nueva brecha en las negociaciones sobre la interrupción de los programas nucleares militares del país iraní, el cual todavía no ha demostrado con éxito la posesión del arma nuclear. Este escenario comprendía no solo serios desafíos en cuanto a su incremento exponencial de enriquecimiento de uranio, sino también a un posible aumento de la escalada de tensiones con su vecina Israel que terminara por provocar una nueva carrera nuclear en Oriente Próximo y el Mediterráneo Oriental³⁶.

El asesinato en octubre de 2020 de Mohsen Fajrizadeh, jefe del programa nuclear iraní y cuya autoría los iraníes atribuyen a Israel, ha complicado la actual situación³⁷. En el ámbito de la ciberseguridad, además, se han planteado nuevas fórmulas de sabotajes cibernéticos a programas nucleares como el sucedido a Irán en 2010 a través del virus informático Stuxnet, cuya autoría nunca fue oficialmente atribuida pero también se apuntó a Israel y a Estados Unidos como colaboradores del ataque³⁸. Esta y otras formas

³⁴ Ídem, 176.

³⁵ Entrevista a D. Vicente Garrido, experto en asuntos de no proliferación nuclear, desarme y control de armamentos. Madrid, mayo 2021.

³⁶ Gobierno de España (2011). *Estrategia Española de Seguridad*. Real Instituto Elcano. 1-88. Pág. 82.

³⁷ GARDNER, Frank (2020). *Mohsen Fajrizadeh: Iran scientist 'killed by remote-controlled weapon'*. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55128970>

³⁸ NAKASHIMA, Ellen y WARRICK, Joby (2012). *Stuxnet was work of U.S. and Israeli experts, officials say*. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main-stuxnet%3Ahomepage%2Ft%3A-stuxnet&hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main-stuxnet%3Ahomepage%2Ft%3A-stuxnet

de amenazas cibernéticas en la guerra híbrida que mantienen Irán e Israel están, desde una perspectiva regional, contribuyendo a una mayor escalada de tensiones y conflictos.

Lo anterior muestra cómo los conflictos y tensiones regionales entre países proliferantes se erigen como potenciadores del riesgo en la arquitectura global del régimen de no proliferación. Además de las consecuencias para la economía, la estabilidad o la seguridad globales, también se valora el componente multiplicador: en el supuesto de conflicto nuclear entre India y Pakistán podrían interferir otros Estados (como China) y crear un efecto multiplicador. Similar preocupación se da en un enfrentamiento entre Israel e Irán, o entre Estados Unidos y China. Un eventual rearme nuclear internacional debido a la falta de entendimiento general por cuestiones territoriales, ideológicas o geopolíticas podría suponer en última instancia presiones y creación de alianzas, bandos y coaliciones, precipitando a los países involucrados y no involucrados a entrar en un nuevo conflicto mundial.

Conclusiones

Las profundas transformaciones geopolíticas a nivel global en relación con las armas de destrucción masiva suponen un grave desafío para la arquitectura global del régimen de no proliferación. Tras conocer la actual realidad nuclear se puede concluir que existe un desafío nuclear en aumento, interrelacionado y altamente disruptivo desde la perspectiva española.

Se han identificado tres potenciadores del riesgo que han llevado a la actual falta de entendimiento mundial en las cuestiones de no proliferación: el factor de estancamiento en la universalidad del TNP, el elemento revisionista como contrapeso al *statu quo* y el carácter protagonista de los Estados no nucleares en el progresivo proceso de desarme nuclear. Estos tres elementos de intereses contrapuestos —y la mayor parte del tiempo excluyentes— provocan que la proliferación vuelva a imperar en los cálculos políticos de los Estados nucleares. Estos países, a su vez, están tensando unas relaciones internacionales que difícilmente pueden tener un buen porvenir a largo plazo, por lo que las dinámicas internacionales que persiguen la distensión nuclear mundial se mantienen, hoy en día, lejanas.

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Norms of INTEREST

ADEQUACY TO THE LEGISLATION ON INTERNATIONAL TAX TRANSPARENCY

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In our edition of last October 2021, we presented an analysis of Bill 624 by which adjustments are made to the legislation on international tax transparency and the prevention of money laundering, terrorist financing and financing of

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Project 624 was sanctioned, becoming Law 254 of November 11, 2021 published in the Official Gazette 29,413 -A, to which we will not make further reference because it was analyzed in the last edition. *L&E*

PREFERRED INTEREST EXTENDED FOR NEW HOMES

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Law 255 of November 17, 2021 was enacted, which modifies Law 94 of 2019 that establishes a preferential interest regime on certain mortgage loans.

Law 255 provides that preferential mortgage loans granted from the moment of its promulgation until August 1, 2024 will benefit from tax benefits, with the previously established exceptions.

Similarly, it is established that the first sale of new homes will be exempt from the real estate transfer tax, provided that it is the first sale and purchase transaction, which

occurs within five years after the occupancy permit.

In such a way that new homes with a construction permit issued in the period from July 1, 2016 to July 1, 2022 are exempt from the real estate transfer tax. Before the reform, the period ran from July 1, 2016 to July 1, 2019.

The benefit is also extended to new homes with an occupancy permit issued before July 1, 2023. The reform focuses on extending the term, since before it was until July 1, 2022. *L&E*

TEACHING URBANITY IN STUDY PLANS

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Through Law 251 of November 8, 2021, the teaching of urbanity and the care and attention of ecosystem animals is established as transversal axes in related subjects in the study plans of the Panamanian educational system.

It has been established that the teaching of urbanity aims to train people capable of expressing themselves in an open, tolerant, fair, free, respectful, supportive and responsible way, as well as knowing their identity, individuality and personal dignity as part of humanity and to build projects to achieve a harmonious coexistence and a better quality of life with others and their environment.

Regarding the teaching of the care and attention of the animals of the ecosystem, it implies promoting public awareness about the care and love that we must have for animals, strengthening the responsible practice of the trend of pets in homes and promoting respect and empathy towards animals.

MEDUCA will be responsible for preparing the guides, documents, books and other tools necessary to optimize the teaching of urbanity and the care and attention of the animals in the ecosystem.

It is worth mentioning that Law 251 in comment, will come into force the school year following its promulgation. *L&T*

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES FOR SENIOR ADULTS

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With the enactment of Law 253 of November 9, 2021, participation of older adults is encouraged and it is established that the objective of facilitating economic and commercial opportunities for older adults and promoting silver economy within the national territory for achievement of equal opportunities without age discrimination.

The silver economy has been defined as products and services aimed at people over the age of sixty, and any person aged sixty years or older is considered an older adult. Within this context, an older adult enterprise is understood to be a company created by people over sixty years of age, with gross income or annual turnover of a maximum of two million five hundred thousand dollars.

It will be the responsibility of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Authority to promote the silver

economy, the opportunities and benefits associated with it, as well as to promote the entrepreneurship of older adults through training programs, tutorials and advice for the development of business skills..

In the same way, the Authority must establish the requirements to certify the enterprises of older adults and the companies that are part of the silver economy.

On the other hand, the Authority must also create a special socioeconomic program aimed at entrepreneurship in the segment of the elderly population and flexible financing programs aimed at companies in the silver economy and elderly entrepreneurs.

Law 253 will be regulated within a period of no more than ninety days, counted from the enactment and will take effect six months after enactment, that is, as of May 10, 2022. *L&T*

ARTISAN COSMETIC PRODUCTS

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Through Executive Decree No. 875 of November 18, 2021, the elaboration of artisan cosmetic products is regulated, which are followed by EPCA in Panama.

Decree 875 defines what should be understood as artisanal and cosmetic product, the latter being understood as personal care products, such as creams, emulsions, lotions, balms, gels, oils for skin, hydro or oil serums, makeup except for eye contour, soaps, bath products, perfumes, toilet water, eau de toilette, deodorants, which are included within the categories of cosmetic products prepared based on traditional formulas and techniques that do not involve industrial processes technified.

It has been established that for the elaboration of artisanal products, the interested parties must register with the Pharmacy and Drugs Directorate, as a non-pharmaceutical establishment, which will be valid for two years and the renewal must be submitted one month before expiration.

The Decree indicates that the artisans who are dedicated to the elaboration of these products must undergo compulsory training three times a year, in the same way, the personnel who will carry out the elaboration of artisan cosmetics must use protective implements, such as hair covers, glasses, gloves, aprons, which at all times must be clean and in good condition for use.

Another aspect to mention is that, on the product label, on the primary or secondary packaging or in the attached instructions, the corresponding precautionary legends must be included, which will be expressed in several languages at the same time, provided that one is in Spanish, which must be drafted in such a way as not to mislead or confuse the consumer.

On the other hand, all products that indicate the cure of any disease or any product that can be ingested, inhaled or injected into the human body are not considered cosmetic products, since they should only be applied topically. *L&E*

REGULATIONS MANDATORY TEACHING OF BUSINESS CULTURE AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

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Through Executive Decree 2072 of November 17, 2021, Law 128 of March 3, 2020 is regulated, which establishes the mandatory teaching of business culture and entrepreneurship as a transversal axis in the related subjects of the plans of study of the first and second levels of education that are taught in the official and private educational centers of the country.

Develops Executive Decree 2072, the general objectives of the compulsory teaching of business culture, being these: 1. Develop the transversal axis of business culture and entrepreneurship in the first and second levels, promoting the development of academic-practical activities, through mediation classroom pedagogical. 2. Support the development of the transversal axis by training teachers in the activities and methodological strategies of the specialty and use of pedagogical didactic material to achieve competencies.

It should be noted that the focus of the entrepreneurial culture of entrepreneurship as a transversal axis will be present in the academic areas that make up the curriculum, with emphasis on the evaluation of work, exploration of skills and interests and application in

the student's community, taking as base science and technology, learning, learning by doing, observing, testing, manipulating, building and recreating.

It contemplates the Executive Decree in reference, that the teacher of the second level of education or professional and technical secondary education, will apply the strategies that lead the students to the conviction of the elaboration of productive projects that can lead them to their overcoming in the personal and economic level. For which he must teach to learn, to be and to do; link theory with practice; interrelate thought with action; Promote teamwork; stimulate creative capacity and promote work planning.


On the other hand, teachers will plan activities according to the contents of the current study program, related to the transversal axis of business culture and entrepreneurship, in such a way that it is visible in the context of the teaching and learning process.

Taking into account that on April 16 of each year the World Entrepreneurship Day is celebrated, it has been established that extracurricular activities allusive to

the subject and / or significant events, such as talks, seminars, may be carried out at the national, regional or local level. mural or billboard contests, internships in local companies that can support your projects.

Within this context, it has been established that, during the month of September of each year, educational centers of the second level of education or secondary education may participate in competitions and fairs at the regional and national level, with a view to promoting the scope of business and entrepreneurship culture.

Finally, we can comment that the implementation of the compulsory teaching of business culture and entrepreneurship as a transversal axis in related subjects in the study plans of the Panamanian educational system will be effective as of the 2022 school year. *L&T*



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TEMPORARY EXTENSION MEASURE RAISED

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Through Resolution No. 695 of September 24, 2021, the National Directorate of Pharmacies and Drugs of the Ministry of Health, resolved to lift provisional measure of validity of documents that are processed in said Directorate and grant a maximum term of six months from promulgation of Resolution to renew the documents.

The documents that accepted the extension and must be renewed are: **1. Health records. 2. Certificate of good storage practices. 3. Certificate of**

good manufacturing practices. 4. Operating licenses. 5. Special permits for drug station. 6. Certificate of registration of raw material special license for controlled substances. 7. Permit to import, export or re-export controlled substances vouchers. 8. Monthly and quarterly report on controlled substances.

The six months indicated in Resolution 695 will begin to run as of November 23, 2021, the date on which it was promulgated in the official gazette. *L&E*

Politics

SPECIFICATIONS OF THE THOMSON - URRUTIA TREATY

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When the Department of Panama became independent from the Republic of Colombia, becoming a sovereign state on November 3, 1903, it was the result of a desire of Panamanians, who for 82 years suffered to be a distant and forgotten territory, turned into a scene of wars and conflicts of others, abandoned in its economic development, in education and in health. In this regard, the Declaration of Independence of Panama, written by Dr. Eusebio A. Morales, said: "The contracts and negotiations on the Railroad and the Panama Canal and the national revenues collected on the Isthmus have produced large sums for Colombia."

He then he affirmed: "of these large sums the Isthmus has not received the benefit of a bridge for its many rivers; nor that of the construction of a road between their populations; neither that of a public building, nor that of a school, nor has it seen any interest in promoting its industries, nor has the smallest part

of those funds been used to promote prosperity".

Prior to 1903, Panamanians carried out various separatist movements such as that of September 25, 1830; of March 21, 1831, which lasted one month and ten days; of November 18, 1840, which made Panama the "State of the Isthmus"; of June 7, 1841 when Colonel Tomás Herrera was unanimously elected Constitutional President of the Free State of the Isthmus. From 1852 to 1885 the "Federal State of Panama" was developed, proposed by Dr. Justo Arosemena. In 1861, the Colón Agreement with Santiago De La Guardia claims our federalist rights.

Obviously, these aspirations and movements of the Panamanians didn't go unnoticed by the Colombians, to the point that in 1834 the Colombian senator Francisco Soto declared in the Colombian Congress that "by nature the Isthmus of Panama is called

to be independent, since this independence will have to be achieved before, already later, sooner or later, a century from now or ten years from now, but it is certain that if the New Granada to which the isthmeños belong with their pleasure, it will adopt those measures of trust and brotherhood, it is clear, I repeat, that the government of New Granada anticipated what will happen in the course of ten years".

Twenty-one years later, in 1855, Senator Pedro Fernández Madrid, who was President of the Colombian Senate between 1854 and 1855, expressed himself in the same way when stating that "I am going to give my vote to the Bill that creates the State of Panama because I know the need for the isthmus to establish itself on the basis of "self-government", but it doesn't hide that this is but the first step that that section of the republic takes towards independence, sooner or later the Isthmus of Panama will be lost to the New Granada".

Equally interesting are other statements for the reader's knowledge, both from American and Colombian political figures that describe the situation that existed at that time. In 1866, the United States Consul in Panama, in a message to the Secretary of State of his own country, said: "Three-quarters of the inhabitants of the isthmus desire the separation and independence of Panama. They would rebel if they could procure arms and knew that the United States would not intervene".

For his part, the President of the United States, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JR., Before the Congress of his country declared "that the authority of Colombia

over Panama could not be maintained without the armed intervention and aid of the United States." These and other comments by prominent Colombians, such as Dr. Carlos Martínez Silva, Don Lorenzo Marroquín, narrated a reality as a consequence of the MALLARINO-BIDLACK Treaty of 1846 between the United States and Colombia by means of which the United States became the guarantor of the Colombian sovereignty over the Isthmus of Panama.

However, the straw that broke the camel's back occurred on August 12, 1903, when the Colombian Senate rejected the Herran-Hay Treaty with the United States of America on the construction of a canal through the Isthmus of Panama. The outrage that this caused to Panamanians, coupled with their already damaged relations with the Colombian government, awakens again the independence sentiment of the isthmeños, more this time with the urgency of having the support of the great northern country, interested in crystallize your desire to build the Panama Canal.

This confluence of interests and aspirations results in the United States, taking into account its important economic and military interests in the first place, quickly supported and recognized the independence of Panama.

For all the above, Panamanians should NOT feel undermined by the help received from the United States. It is enough to remember the support that the United States received from France with the French General Lafayette and his soldiers and also from Spain, who contributed decisively with the United States in its war of emancipation against the British Empire.

Thus, the Isthmus of Panama becomes independent from Colombia on November 3, 1903. Once the Colombian government learned of the declaration of independence, it accused the United States of being the cause of what happened. Faced with this reality, the Colombian government tried to carry out a series of plans with the purpose of achieving the reincorporation of the Isthmus of Panama. First, they tried to convince the United States to recognize Colombia's sovereignty over Panama, while also requesting the cooperation of other countries on the continent to help in that endeavor..

They also tried to persuade Panamanians to reconsider the decision taken. In this strategy, their first action was the arrival in Colón, on November 15, 1903, just 12 days after our independence, of a mission made up of a Colombian delegation that met aboard the US ship *Mayflower*, with a representation of the new Panamanian government, a meeting that didn't result in any agreement as the Panamanians rejected all the proposals of the Colombians, including that of safeguarding the interests of Panama, preserving their rights in exchange for the reintegration of the Isthmus of Panama to Colombia.

The second high-level delegation from Colombia sent to Panama occurs on November 20, 1903, when the Canadian-flagged *Canada* steamer arrives in the city of Colón. The Colombian and Panamanian representations met and adduced reasons for and against, each one supporting their respective positions, including the suggestion of the Colombian delegation that attracted much attention, of the

transfer of the capital of Colombia to Panama City.

After the dialogue, in a cordial and friendly manner, of speeches made by both delegations, that same November 20, General Rafael Reyes, a member of the Colombian delegation, sent a cable to Colombia informing the Vice President in Charge of the Executive Branch, José Manuel Marroquín and members of his cabinet, that the negotiations "had been broken" and that a friendly settlement was impossible. He also added that the "American government didn't allow the landing of Colombian troops on Panamanian coasts".

It is striking that while these aforementioned conferences were being held, the Head of the Colombian Executive Branch, José Manuel Marroquín, was ordering, on November 11, a recruitment of one hundred thousand soldiers, of whom 500 men from the *Tiradores Battalion* later settled in the banks of the *Titumate River*, in the Province of *Darién*, determined to increase the number further on January 1, 1904 to invade Panama, but they abandoned this plan due to inclement weather in the *Darién* jungle and fear of the troops Americans who might spot them.

On the other hand, there was the Colombian General Rafael Reyes, who in Washington, DC, suggested concluding all kinds of military action against Panama, because in accordance with Article 1 of the *Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty*, "the United States of America is bound to guarantee the independence of Panama "and, indisputably, the United States would be obliged to abide by it.

Later, both United States, Colombia and Panama, initiated treaty projects such as Cortés-Root and Cortés-Arosemena in 1909, the purpose of which was for Colombia to recognize the independence of Panama and settle the differences that the United States maintained with the Republic of Colombia. because of the independence of Panama. Both treaties were rejected by the Colombians and were not ratified.

In 1914 the First World War was declared and the President of the United States, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, thinking about the security of the canal that had just been inaugurated, sent Thadeus A. Thompson to Colombia in March 1913, in order to erase and forget everything that had altered the friendship between both countries as a result of what happened in Panama in 1903.

The draft treaty and its negotiation were presented at the initiative of the United States and were widely discussed in the Senate and the House of Representatives of Colombia. The treaty was signed in Bogotá between the United States and Colombia on April 6, 1914, by the American plenipotentiary Thadeus A. Thompson and by Francisco José Urrutia Olano on the part of Colombia and became known as the Urrutia-Thompson Treaty, which became law of the republic on July 9, 1914 under the presidency of Carlos E. Restrepo, but it had to be ratified by the United States Senate, which didn't pass.

Instead, it was modified, and discussions of those modifications upset the matter until 1921. In

1918, the US government sent Minister Hoffman Philip to Colombia with 12 intended modifications to the treaty. After the exchange on the subject between both countries, in 1919 the Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate of the United States emitted a favorable report to the ratification. Seven years after its signing, and 18 years after the independence of Panama, the treaty was ratified by the United States Congress on April 11, 1921.

By virtue of this treaty, Colombia and the United States agreed on points on:

a) Transportation through the Canal, without paying fees to the United States, of Colombian troops, warships, and war materials;

b) The exemption of any tax or right to the products of the soil and the Colombian industry that pass through the Canal, as well as the mail;

c) The admission to the Canal Zone of Colombian soil and industrial products without paying other duties paid by the United States for similar products. These products would also be admitted to the islands and mainland that the United States will occupy in the future on the Isthmus of Panama, outside the Canal Zone;

d) The exemption of all tolls, taxes or rights for Colombian citizens who cross the Canal Zone;

e) The use of the railroad between Ancón and Cristóbal when the Canal is interrupted to transport troops, war materials, products and mail from Colombia, through payment that the United States pays for the same use. The same use will be given to the railroad to transport the officials, agents and employees of the Government of Colombia;

f) The rights and special concessions granted to Colombia for the transportation of coal, oil and salt from one coast of Colombia to another;

g) The payment to Colombia of the sum of twenty-five million pesos (as compensation for the separation of Panama, which removed the country from the influence and backwardness it was in);

h) The recognition by Colombia of the independence of Panama and the establishment of limits of the Republic of Panama in accordance with what is indicated in the Colombian Law of June 9, 1855;

i) The commitment of the United States to obtain from Panama the dispatch of a Special Agent to negotiate with Colombia a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the reestablishment of relations between Panama and Colombia and the settlement of the pecuniary obligations (foreign debt) between the two countries.

However, during the discussions that took place, including in the text of said treaty, no observation was made of the inclination for freedom of the Panamanian man, as evidenced by antecedents of acts of national affirmation, such as those that occurred in 1830, 1831, 1840, 1855, 1861. In its 118 years of free and sovereign life, the Republic of Panama has proved to the world its deep nationalist spirit and its irrevocable will to have a homeland and its absolute dignity in the face of the United States and giving evident proof of its reality of Nation.

Although it is true that the interference of the United States in the independence of Panama responded to its own interests, the examples of sacrifice and struggle for the continuous devotion of Panamanians to have a free and sovereign land are equally true. With this, the black legends that affected the republic in the first years of our existence are left behind.

It is important to note that the Republic of Panama didn't participate in Urrutia-Thompson Treaty negotiations, nor did it empower United States to represent it. Therefore, none of agreements reached there were binding on Panama. When treaty was approved, Panama protested and didn't recognize the border limits. The border between Panama and Colombia was established by a treaty on August 20, 1924, which was signed on December 5, 1924 and entered into force on January 31, 1925.

Finally, pointing out that the Republic of Panama was

a nation created by the Americans is a false thesis, regardless of all financial speculations, commercial transactions and others that were part of that event of great historical significance that it represents for Panamanians. Historical events since we became independent from Spain in 1821 prove otherwise.

The objective history shows numerous testimonies and foundations that guarantee the authenticity of our independence from Colombia. Panama, without a doubt, did well to take advantage of that opportunity and circumstance to gain independence from Colombia, to whom we had voluntarily joined in 1821 to avoid a reconquest of the Spanish because we Panamanians were few and we had no army or a fleet. of war to preserve independence, adhering above all to Simón Bolívar's dream of integrating a great confederation that would unite the former Spanish colonies to protect each other.

Regardless of the situations that involved the independence of Panama from Colombia in 1903, Panama, affirming its vocation to be faithful to its own national identity after independence, Panamanians undertook through different generations and government administrations, their struggle continues to ensure the subsistence of the state and nationality, recovering its national sovereignty throughout its territory and all this wouldn't have been possible if we hadn't reaffirmed and fully verified the preexistence of our condition of authentic nation from the beginning.

In such a way that Panama did not act in silence and always protested in relation to this agreement that

harmed its interests, which was not consulted or taken into account, much less gave a mandate to the United States to represent it.

Today the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty, like the Urrutia-Thompson Agreement, are part of the past of a nation that over time and its continuous vocation to defend its sovereignty ensured the subsistence and improvement of the national, free and sovereign State.

On May 8, 1924, the protocol was signed that contained the recognition of the independence of Panama by Colombia, the commitment to negotiate and conclude a boundary convention and a peace and friendship treaty, and the exchange of diplomatic officials between both nations. Nicolás Victoria Jaén was appointed by Panama as Ambassador to Colombia and Colombia appointed José María González Valencia. Subsequently, the Panamanian ambassador signed in Bogotá a boundary treaty with the Colombian Foreign Minister Jorge Vélez which was approved by the National Assembly of the Republic of Panama and by the Congress of Colombia, through laws 65 and 53 of 1924 respectively. The ratifications were exchanged in Bogotá on January 31, 1925.

This is how the Urrutia-Thompson Treaty remained as a historical relic of the past, currently surpassed by the intention of both peoples and governments to maintain a legitimate coexistence of mutual respect for the free and dignified spirit of both nations.^{L&E}

Panamanian ECONOMY

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI): OCTOBER 2021

Source: GCRP

Monthly variation of the National Urban CPI (October 2021 compared to September 2021):

The groups that showed an increase were: Transportation by 1.0%; Restaurants and hotels in 0.6%; Food and non-alcoholic beverages, and Housing, water, electricity and gas both at 0.3%; Furniture, household items and ordinary household maintenance by 0.2%; and Communications at 0.1%.

The increase observed in Transportation group was due to increase in two of its seven classes. The greatest variation was in class "Fuels and lubricants for personal transportation equipment" in 3.3%, due to the rise in the price of automobile fuel.

Restaurants and hotels group showed growth in one of its two classes, "Restaurants, cafes and similar establishments" by 0.6%, due to the increase in the price of food and non-alcoholic beverages outside the home.

The rise registered in the Food and non-alcoholic beverages group was due to increase in eight of its eleven classes. The greatest variation was in class "Sugar, jam, honey, chocolate and sugar sweets" in 1.5%, due to rise in the price of sugar.

The increase presented in the Housing, water, electricity and gas group was due to the growth in two of its eight classes: The class with the greatest variation was "Gas" in 1.9%, due to the rise in the price of the 100-pound gas tank.

The Furniture, household items and ordinary household maintenance group showed an increase in one of its eleven classes, "Non-durable household goods" by 0.8%, due to the rise in the price of kitchen paper and other non-durable products.

The growth reflected in the Communications group was due to the 0.5% increase in one of its two classes, "Telephone equipment".

Recreation and culture group registered a slight variation, and Education remained without variation. The groups that presented casualties were: Alcoholic beverages and tobacco in 0.4%; Clothing and footwear by 0.2%; Health, and Miscellaneous goods and services both at 0.1%.

The decrease observed in the Alcoholic beverages and tobacco group was due to the decrease in two of its four classes: "Beer" in 0.7%, and "Tobacco" in

0.1%, due to a decrease in the price of cigarettes. The Clothing and footwear group reflected a reduction in two of its four classes: "Shoes and other footwear" by 0.4%, due to the decrease in the price of girls' sneakers and sandals, and "Clothing" by 0.2%, due to the decrease in the price of clothing for men, women and girls. Health group presented reduction in three of its seven classes. The greatest variation was in the class "Artifacts and therapeutic equipment" in 0.6%, due to the drop in the price of lenses.

The decrease registered in the group Miscellaneous goods and services was due to the decrease in two of its ten classes: "Other appliances, articles and products for personal care" and "Jewelry, wall clocks and wrist watches" both by 0.2%. The reduction in the class "Other appliances, articles and products for personal care" was due to the decrease in the price of personal care items and other products for personal care, and in "Jewelry, wall clocks and wrist watches"

it was due to the decrease in the price of jewelry.

• Interannual variation of the National Urban CPI (October 2021 compared to October 2020):

The National Urban CPI showed an interannual variation of 2.9%. The groups that showed increases were: Transportation in 11.7%; Education at 3.1%; Food and non-alcoholic beverages at 2.6%; Housing, water, electricity and gas at 2.5%; Restaurants and hotels in 2.1%; Miscellaneous goods and services at 0.7%; Health at 0.6%; and Furniture, household items and ordinary household maintenance by 0.5%. The groups that presented decreases were: Clothing and footwear in 0.8%; Alcoholic beverages and tobacco at 0.3%; Communications, and Recreation and culture both at 0.1%.

Next, the graph with the monthly incidence by group of the National Urban CPI for October 2021:




Incidence: Corresponds to the contribution of each group with respect to the total variation of the National Urban Index, therefore, the sum of the incidents results in the variation of the index.

CUADRO 1. INCIDENCIA Y VARIACIÓN PORCENTUAL MENSUAL DEL ÍNDICE DE PRECIOS AL CONSUMIDOR NACIONAL URBANO, SEGÚN GRUPO DE ARTÍCULOS Y SERVICIOS: OCTUBRE DE 2021
BASE 2013=100

Grupo de artículos y servicios	Ponderaciones	Incidencia	Variación mensual
TOTAL	100.0	0.3	0.3
Alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas	22.4	0.072	0.3
Bebidas alcohólicas y tabaco	0.7	-0.002	-0.4
Prendas de vestir y calzado	7.7	-0.015	-0.2
Vivienda, agua, electricidad y gas	8.5	0.022	0.3
Muebles, artículos para el hogar y para la conservación ordinaria del hogar	7.8	0.011	0.2
Salud	3.4	-0.002	-0.1
Transporte	16.8	0.177	1.0
Comunicaciones	4.3	0.002	0.1
Recreación y cultura	9.7	-0.002	0.0
Educación	2.4	0.000	-
Restaurantes y hoteles	6.7	0.051	0.6
Bienes y servicios diversos	9.8	-0.012	-0.1

- Cantidad nula o cero.

0.0 Cuando la cantidad es menor a la mitad de la unidad o fracción decimal adoptada para la expresión del dato.



CUADRO 2. EVOLUCIÓN DEL ÍNDICE DE PRECIOS AL CONSUMIDOR NACIONAL URBANO, SEGÚN GRUPO DE ARTÍCULOS Y SERVICIOS: ENERO-OCTUBRE DE 2021

Grupo de artículos y servicios	Variación porcentual mensual									
	2021									
	Enero	Febrero	Marzo	Abril	Mayo	Junio	Julio	Agosto	Septiembre	Octubre
TOTAL	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.3
Alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas	0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.3
Bebidas alcohólicas y tabaco	0.5	0.0	0.3	-0.2	-0.4	0.3	0.0	-0.6	0.5	-0.4
Prendas de vestir y calzado	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.2	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.2
Vivienda, agua, electricidad y gas	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.3
Muebles, artículos para el hogar y para la conservación ordinaria del hogar	-0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
Salud	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.1
Transporte	1.6	2.9	2.3	0.7	1.0	0.7	1.0	-0.1	-0.3	1.0
Comunicaciones	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.2	-0.1	0.1
Recreación y cultura	-	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Educación	-1.6	4.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Restaurantes y hoteles	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	-0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.6
Bienes y servicios diversos	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.4	-0.2	0.2	-0.1

- Cantidad nula o cero.

0.0 Cuando la cantidad es menor a la mitad de la unidad o fracción decimal adoptada para la expresión del dato.

MONTHLY INDEX OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (IMAE): SEPTEMBER 2021

Source: GCRP

The accumulated IMAE of January-September 2021 showed an increase of 14.94%, compared to the same period of 2020. This growth continues to show the process of recovery of economic activity, after the impact of the health emergency caused by COVID-19.

In the analysis of the accumulated period, the activities that registered a favorable behavior were: Mining, Construction, Commerce, Other community activities, Social and personal services, Transportation, Storage and communications, Private health services, Electricity and water, Administration public, manufacturing industries and agriculture.

On the contrary, the sectors that presented negative rates were: Hotels and restaurants, Private households with domestic services, Education, Financial intermediation, Fishing and Real estate, business and rental activities.

The following is a comment on the evolution of some activities: The mining industry registered a good performance associated with the export of copper ore and its concentrate, likewise, Construction due to the execution of public investments and the gradual reactivation of many private projects.

Commercial activity showed a positive rate in its main indicators such as re-exports in metric tons from the Colon Free Zone, and local retail and wholesale trade.

Transportation, storage and communications services continue with positive results in the Canal tolls, telecommunications, the movement of TEU containers of the National Port System and the commercial movement in the Colon Free Zone.

Likewise, the Electricity and water category presented a positive range, mainly in the generation of renewable electricity and consumption in the commercial, industrial and Government areas.

Among the activities that presented negative rates in the accumulated period, January - September, were: Services in hotels, especially, due to the low influx of tourists, hikers and passengers in transit.

Private households with domestic services, due to the few personnel employed in this activity, due to the labor situation facing the country. Financial intermediation showed a decrease due to financial services, however, the insurance activity registered an

increase due to the higher volume of written premiums.

The fishing activity due to decrease in the capture of some export-oriented species, including fish and fresh and frozen fish fillet; however, shrimp registered increases.


Among the economic activities that registered positive year-on-year results (September 2021-20) we can mention:

Industrial manufacturing production in some activities related to the production of food products.

In the agricultural sector, activities such as: The raising of pigs, poultry and the cultivation of pineapple.

The provision of entertainment and entertainment services, mainly in betting in gambling halls of luck and chance, from type A slot machines, and betting halls for sporting events registered positive rates.

Some indicators related to construction activity such as the production of cement and ready-mix concrete. *L&E*



CURRENT STATE INCOME ADDED B/.4,620 MILLION

Source: MEF

At the end of October of this year, the current income accumulated since January in cash of the State totaled B/. 4,620 million, which reflects an increase of B/. 658.3 million, that is, 16.6%, against the same period of the year 2020 and a surplus of B/. 623.3 million compared to the budget, details Preliminary Collection Report of General Directorate of Revenues (DGI) of Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF).

The collection of accumulated tax revenue at the preliminary closing of the tenth month of 2021, was B/. 3,488.7 million, reflecting a surplus of 14%, compared to the budgeted figure and 15.3% more than that collected in the same period of the previous year.

While non-tax income reached the sum of B/. 1,079 million, reflecting 28.5% above budget and an increase of 19.9% in relation to what was collected in 2020.

Meanwhile, in October 2021, current income totaled B/. 432.1 million. Of the great total, B/. 321.5 million belong to the collection of tax revenues, B/. 106.8 million to non-tax income and B/. 3.7 million to other current income. The current income collected in October shows a deficit of B/. 109.9 million compared to the amount budgeted for that month, but an increase of B/. 57.8 million in relation to the amount collected in 2020. *L&E*

PANAMA CANAL HIRES USEGE FOR CONSULTING SERVICES AND TECHNICAL ADVICE FOR THE WATER PROJECT PROGRAM

Source: ACP

The Panama Canal signed a contract with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for consulting and technical advisory services for the Water Projects Program, the objective of which is to achieve an optimized water management system. water, focused on supplying this resource to the population and the waterway.

Last June, the Canal reformulated the bidding model for the construction and start-up of the optimized water management system, in response to the suggestions presented by interested companies during the prequalification process.

The program consists of a portfolio of projects that will provide a solution to supply of raw water for more than half of country's population concentrated in provinces of Panama, Colon and West Panama, as well as for operation of the Canal, considering the development sustainability,climatescenariosandgrowthprojections.

USACE will provide special services for the review of the studies carried out, as well as the identification and performance of those required to evaluate the possible alternatives, develop

models and simulations, and prepare conceptual designs, among other activities of the program.

USACE and the Panama Canal

In 2019, both entities signed a cooperation and technical assistance agreement for the development of engineering services, environmental sustainability, operation, disaster damage reduction, and risk analysis for the integrated management of water resources, among other activities.

USACE has detailed knowledge and information on the hydrology and operation of the Panama Canal. In 1997, IT developed a study of infrastructure of the Panama Canal, prior to its transfer to Panamanian hands, which allowed the formulation of a master plan that identified more than 800 tasks that needed to be carried out to transfer it to the Panamanian administration under the appropriate conditions.

Since then, has participated in the analysis, maintenance and improvements of the waterway, accumulating experiences and knowledge that are strategic for the program, including evaluation projects on water

supply alternatives to meet the Canal's operational needs and participation in the conceptual design of the third set of locks in the Atlantic, among others.

USACE provides technical assistance in more than 100 countries around the world, including the maintenance of more than 700 dams, 24,000 kilometers of levees, 21,000 kilometers of ports and canals, and 240 locks in the United States, where it is responsible for the maintenance of river hydraulic structures. , mainly.

By constitutional mandate, the Panama Canal is responsible for ensuring the administration, maintenance, use and conservation of the water resources of its hydrographic basin, within which are the Gatún and Alhajuela reservoirs, the main sources of water for the population of the country and the transit of ships.

The Water Projects Program is aimed at guaranteeing sustainable development and long-term business viability. *L&E*

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World ECONOMY



NACIONES UNIDAS

C E P A L

ECLAC URGES THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO WORK MORE AND BETTER TO CLOSE GLOBAL ASYMMETRIES IN THE FIELD OF FINANCING AND RESILIENCE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

During an event at COP26, Alicia Bárcena called for increased international cooperation on green technologies, capacities and financing, to improve both resilience and the green transition in the region.

The executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Alicia Bárcena, today urged the international community to work harder and better to close global asymmetries in terms of financing and resilience to climate change, during a side event to the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP26, held in Glasgow, Scotland.

"We value recent commitments to curb methane emissions, halt deforestation, finance cleaner energy infrastructure, and internalize climate risks in the operations of financial institutions, including the IMF. However, more needs to be done to close global asymmetries in financing and resilience to climate change", stressed the senior United Nations official during the virtual event "Climate finance and trade to build resilience to climate change".

The highest representative of ECLAC participated in the opening panel of the event, together with Rebeca Grynspan, secretary general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD); Pamela Coke-Hamilton, Executive Director of the International Trade Center (ITC), and Courtenay Rattray, High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (OHRLLS). The panel was moderated by Jean-Paul Adam, Director of Climate Change, Natural Resource Management and Technology at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (CEPA).

During her intervention, Alicia Bárcena underscored the urgency of redistributing global liquidity to all vulnerable countries that need it, regardless of their income level, to enable a climate-resilient recovery. This includes recycling newly allocated special drawing rights (SDRs) to establish a trust fund to support middle-income countries, particularly small island developing states (SIDS), to finance investment projects for sustainable development..

"We welcome the call by Barbados Prime Minister Mia Mottley to issue \$ 500 billion in SDRs annually for 20 years, or \$ 10 trillion for climate action," he said.

She also highlighted the importance of reforming the global debt architecture and supporting innovative instruments to improve debt repayment capacity

Source: ECLAC

However, “instead of restricting access to the market, we call for greater international cooperation on green technologies, capacities and, of course, financing, to improve both the resilience and the green transition of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean.”, She concluded. *L&T*

@rbcabogados



Banco Mundial

REMITTANCES FLOWS RECORD A SOLID GROWTH OF 7.3% IN 2021

Source: World Bank

In 2021, remittances to low- and middle-income countries are estimated to grow robustly at 7.3% to reach \$ 589 billion. This return to growth exceeds previous estimates and confirms the resilience of flows observed in 2020, when remittances fell by just 1.7% despite the deep global recession triggered by COVID-19, according to estimates in the Review on Migration and Development (i) published today by the World Bank.

For the second year in a row, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (excluding China) are expected to exceed the sum of foreign direct investment (FDI) and external development assistance. This underscores the importance of remittances as a means of vital livelihood that enables households to cover their essential expenses related to food, health and education during periods of economic difficulties in the migrants' countries of origin.

"The remittance flows sent by migrants have been a fundamental complement to public cash transfer programs, which seek to help families facing financial difficulties during the COVID-19 crisis. Facilitating

remittance flows to alleviate tight household budgets should be a critical component of public policy to support global recovery from the pandemic," said Michal Rutkowski, Global Director of the Department of Global Social Protection Practices, and World Bank Work.

Some factors that have contributed to the robust growth of remittances include the determination of migrants to help their families in times of need, coupled with the economic recovery in Europe and the United States, which in turn was supported by fiscal stimulus and employment promotion programs.

In the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and in Russia, the rebound in remittances abroad was also due to the increase in oil prices and the economic recovery that this brought with it.

Solid remittance growth was recorded in most regions. Flows increased by 21.6% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 9.7% in the Middle East and North Africa, 8% in South Asia, 6.2% in Sub-Saharan Africa and 5.3% in Europe and Central Asia. In East Asia and the Pacific, remittances decreased by 4.0%, although if

China is excluded, they registered an increase of 1.4% in the region. In Latin America and the Caribbean, growth was extremely strong due to the economic recovery in the United States and other factors, including the response of migrants to natural disasters in their countries of origin and the remittances sent from these countries to In transit migrants.

The cost of sending USD 200 to another country continued to be high, standing at 6.4% of the amount transferred in the first quarter of 2021, according to the database on the price of sending remittances worldwide maintained by the world Bank.

This represents more than double the 3%, goal set in Sustainable Development Goals and to be achieved by 2030. The most expensive region to send money to is Sub-Saharan Africa (8%), while the cheapest is South Asia (4.6%). The data reveals that costs tend to be higher when remittances are sent through a bank versus digital channels or money transfer operators that offer direct remittance services.

"The immediate impact of the crisis on remittance flows was very profound. The surprising pace of recovery is good news. To preserve remittance flows, particularly through digital channels, it remains critical that migrants and providers of remittance services can access bank accounts. Policy responses also need to continue to ensure the inclusion of migrants, particularly in the areas of access to vaccines and protection against insufficient remuneration," said Dilip Ratha, lead author of the review and head of the Global Knowledge Alliance on Migration and Development (KNOMAD).

Remittances are expected to increase 2.6% in 2022, in line with global macroeconomic forecasts. A resurgence of COVID-19 cases and the imposition of new restrictions on mobility pose the main risks that the outlook for global growth, employment and remittance flows to developing countries will not

materialize. The gradual dismantling of fiscal stimulus and employment promotion packages, in a context of economic recovery, could also harm remittance flows.

Regional trends in remittances

Officially recorded remittance flows to the East Asia and Pacific region are expected to decline 4.0% in 2021, to reach US\$ 131 billion. Excluding China, remittances in the region increased by 1.4% in 2021, and it is estimated that they will grow by 3.3% in 2022. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the main recipients in the region are the smaller economies, such as Tonga (43.9%), Samoa (21.1%) and the Marshall Islands (12.8%).

Cost of remittances: The average cost to send \$200 to the region fell to 6.7% in the first quarter of 2021 compared to 7.1% a year earlier. The cheapest corridors in the region had an average cost of 2.7% for transfers, mainly to the Philippines, while the five most expensive corridors, excluding South Africa to China (which is atypical), the average cost was 15.0%.

After a drop of 8.6% in 2020, remittance flows to Europe and Central Asia are expected to grow 5.3% in 2021 to reach USD 67 billion, as a result of the rebound in economic activity in the European Union and the increase in energy prices. Remittances are estimated to grow 3.8% in 2022. Currently, remittances are the main source of external financing in the region. Inflows have been equal to or greater than the sum of FDI, portfolio investment and external development assistance in 2020 and 2021. As a percentage of GDP, remittances in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan exceed 25%.

Cost of remittances: The average cost of sending \$ 200 to region increased slightly from 6.5% in 2020 to 6.6% in first quarter of 2021, largely reflecting a drastic increase in costs in the corridor between Turkey. and Bulgaria. Russia, where costs fell from 1.8% to 1%, is one of the

cheapest countries in the world to send remittances.

Remittance flows to Latin America and the Caribbean are likely to reach a new high of USD 126 billion in 2021, representing a solid growth of 21.6% compared to 2020. Mexico, the main recipient of remittances in the region, received 42% (USD 52.7 billion) of the total for the region. The value of remittances as a percentage of GDP exceeds 20% in several of the smaller economies: El Salvador (26.2%), Honduras (26.6%), Jamaica (23.6%) and Guatemala (18, 0%). The adverse effects of COVID-19 and Hurricanes Grace and Ida contributed to increased remittance flows to Mexico and Central America. Other factors behind the increase were the recovery in employment levels and fiscal and social assistance programs in host countries, particularly in the United States. An increase in the number of migrants in transit in Mexico and in other countries, added to the remittances they received from abroad as aid for the costs of stay and travel, seems to have been another important factor that explains this marked increase. Remittances are expected to increase by 4.4% in 2022, mainly due to the prospects for lower growth in the United States..

Cost of remittances: The cost of sending \$ 200 to the region averaged 5.5% in the first quarter of 2021 compared to 6% the year before. With an average cost of 3.7%, Mexico continued to be the cheapest remittance recipient in the Group of Twenty. However, the costs of remittances are exorbitant in the smaller corridors.

Remittances to developing countries in the Middle East and North Africa region are projected to have grown by 9.7% in 2021 to reach USD 62 billion, as a result of the return to growth of host countries in the Union Europe (in particular France and Spain) and the rebound in international oil prices, which had positive effects on the GCC countries. The increase was due to the marked increase in entries to Egypt (12.6%, reaching USD 33 billion) and Morocco (25%,

reaching USD 9300 million), where the phenomena of return migration and Transit migration, respectively, played an important role in these positive results. Remittance income in the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) increased by 15.2%, driven by growth in the euro area. Flows to several countries fell in 2021, including Jordan (6.9% decrease), Djibouti (14.8% decrease) and Lebanon (0.3% decrease). In the developing region of the Middle East and North Africa, remittances have traditionally been the main source of external resources vis-à-vis external development assistance, FDI, portfolio investment and debt flows. By 2022, the outlook for remittance growth is more modest, at 3.6%, due to the risks posed by COVID-19.

Cost of remittances: The cost of sending \$ 200 to the region dropped, from 7.0% a year ago to 6.3% in the first quarter of 2021.

Remittances to South Asia are likely to have grown by around 8% in 2021, to reach \$ 159 billion. Rising oil prices fueled the economic recovery and fueled the rebound in remittances from the GCC countries, which employ more than half of South Asian migrants. The economic recovery in the United States and the stimulus programs implemented by the country also contributed to growth.

In India, remittances increased 4.6% in 2021 to US \$ 87 billion. Pakistan saw another unprecedented year of remittances, with growth of 26% and a volume reaching USD 33 billion in 2021. In addition to usual factors, remittance promotion initiative adopted by the Government of Pakistan to facilitating shipments using formal channels attracted huge volumes. Similarly, the fragile situation in Afghanistan became an unexpected reason for sending remittances in 2021, particularly for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and for families in Afghanistan. Remittances, the volume of which more than doubled FDI in 2021, is the main source of foreign exchange in the region.

Cost of remittances: The region with the lowest average costs in the world is South Asia, with 4.6%. However, sending money to the region using official channels is costly compared to informal channels, which remain popular. Promoting cost reduction policies would create a win-win situation that would be advantageous for migrants and for the governments of the region.

Remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa resumed growth in 2021, increasing 6.2% to US \$ 45 billion. Nigeria, region's main recipient, is seeing a modest rebound in remittance flows, partly due to growing influence of policies aimed at encouraging the use of the banking system to channel remittances. Countries where remittance flows represent a significant percentage of GDP include Gambia (33.8%), Lesotho (23.5%), Cape Verde (15.6%) and the Comoros (12.3%). In 2022, remittance flows are expected to increase by 5.5%, hand in hand with the sustained economic recovery in Europe and the United States.

Cost of remittances: Costs averaged 8% in the first quarter of 2021, up from 8.9% a year ago. Despite the fact that interregional migration represents more than 70% of cross-border migration, the costs are high due to the low volume of formal flows and the use of black market exchange rates.*L&E*



THE INFLATION PROBLEM IN LATIN AMERICA

Source: IMF / Maximilian Appendino
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Inflation has skyrocketed in Latin America's largest economies, and that has prompted major central banks to raise interest rates before economic activity has fully recovered.

Our latest report on the Economic Outlook: The Americas shows how fast inflation is rising. In the


first year of the pandemic, average inflation in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru (LA-5) was below the average for other emerging market economies. Now it is higher, with a year-on-year average of 8% in October, and more than 10.5% in the case of Brazil.

The increase is partly due to rising food

Retorno de la inflación

Debido en parte al rápido aumento de los precios de los alimentos, la inflación en América Latina se ha disparado, provocando aumentos de las tasas al inicio de la recuperación.

(índice de nivel general de precios y de consumo de alimentos; índice: enero de 2019 = 100)



Fuentes: Haver Analytics y cálculos del personal técnico del FML.

Nota: Los agregados están ponderados por la paridad del poder adquisitivo (PPA). Los mercados emergentes (EME) incluyen AL-5, Filipinas, Hungría, India, Indonesia, Malasia, Polonia, Rusia, Sudáfrica y Tailandia. AL-5 comprende Brasil, Chile, Colombia, México y Perú.

IMF

prices. They started to rise even before the pandemic and have risen more than 18% on average in LA-5 countries since January 2020.

In Latin America, food prices represent almost a quarter of the average consumer basket. For households still recovering from the coronavirus crisis, the food shortage leaves fewer resources to spend on other goods. In a region with the highest levels of income inequality, the burden is heaviest for low-income households, who spend a greater proportion of their income on food.

Even core inflation, which excludes food and energy prices, has outpaced the pre-pandemic trend this year, averaging 5.9% year-on-year in October.

Inflationary pressures should be temporary and inflation in the medium term will probably return to the levels set as targets by central banks. But great uncertainty reigns. The pandemic shock is peculiar, and its impact on commodity prices, supply bottlenecks and rising transportation costs is difficult to determine.

Region is also battling a long history of high and unstable inflation, something that constitutes a challenge for central banks that have only recently strengthened their credibility. These antecedents may have led to indexation practices (contracts whose conditions change automatically with inflation) that could further accelerate prices.

There is also the risk that international financial conditions will tighten rapidly in response to the evolution of inflation in advanced economies, leading to an outflow of capital. This possible shock could jeopardize financial stability and depreciate currencies in Latin America, exacerbating inflationary pressures.

Managing expectations, whether through declarations or rate hikes, is a key measure to stop the inflationary spiral, and that is why the region's central banks have been quick to act to preserve their credibility, which has been earned through much effort, in an uncertain environment. All LA-5 countries have already raised their monetary policy rates, and the monetary authorities have issued more bullish messages on the stance of monetary policy. Despite recent interest rate hikes, the monetary policy stance remains generally accommodative and continues to support the ongoing recovery. But even so, the region faces difficult dilemmas, and has to find a balance point between the uncertain inflationary prospects with employment levels still much lower than those observed before the pandemic and an uneven recovery of the labor market in Latin America. *L&E*

CAF PROPOSES A RE-ENGINEERING IN THREE PILLARS TO PROMOTE THE COMMERCIAL INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Source: CAF

The trade liberalization promoted in the last three decades increased investment and trade in Latin America and the Caribbean, albeit in a modest way. In particular, intraregional trade remained stagnant. This diagnosis is part of CAF's 2021 Economy and Development Report, entitled: "Paths to integration: Trade Facilitation, Infrastructure and Global Value Chains", which presents the main advances and challenges that our region faces to achieve a higher level of integration that boosts the productivity and well-being of the countries.

Most of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have implemented trade liberalization policies in last 30 years that reduced tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Although for average of region these policies have generated increases in trade and investment, their magnitude has been modest and does not match expectations about the impact of these initiatives on growth and well-being.

One reason behind this situation is that the agreements did not generate significant and sustained increases in intra-regional trade. This has remained at around 15% of total exports since the mid-1990s, with little variation over time, according to the Economic and Development Report (RED2021) of CAF -development bank of Latin America, entitled: "Paths to Integration: Facilitation of Trade, Infrastructure and Global Value Chains". In contrast, in Europe intra-regional trade has

values close to 60% of the total, while in North America it reaches 45% and in East and Southeast Asia it is 35%.

"These not so encouraging results are partly explained because the regional market has not yet been a space that companies, especially medium and small ones, have been able to take advantage of to integrate commercially and productively, and that this provides opportunities to expand their sales and employment. The reasons for these failures are due to incomplete progress in several of the trade liberalization policies," said Pablo Sanguinetti, vice president of Knowledge at CAF, and co-author of the report.

RED2021 proposes a reengineering of three pillars in the paths for the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean. The first is the reduction in tariff levels applied unilaterally, which in some cases are still high (notably in Caricom and Mercosur); as well as the reduction of customs and border costs through trade facilitation initiatives; the second consists of providing the necessary transportation infrastructure to improve physical integration between countries, including that which favors energy integration; and the third refers to domestic and regional regulations that promote productive integration between economies, promoting the participation of companies in regional value chains.

Trade facilitation includes the simplification, standardization, digitization and harmonization of

the different procedures and procedures that are required to carry out a foreign trade operation and that affect the final cost for the consumer. While border procedures take between 80 and 100 hours in Latin America and the Caribbean (similar to that observed in Asia), the times are reduced to less than 10 hours in North America and the European Union.

In terms of transport, it can be seen that South America faces transport costs for its exports in intraregional trade that are 15% higher than those of European Union, providing evidence of the role of transport costs as a determinant of the low level of trade intrazone. At the extra-regional level, however, no relevant cost differences are observed between South America and the EU. This indicates that the poor performance of transport infrastructure mainly affects intra-regional trade, where land transport plays a preponderant role.

"The evidence discussed in relation to the transportation infrastructure of Latin America shows significant lags in the amount of infrastructure available, as well as in the services it provides. The delay is particularly significant in land infrastructure, be it rail or road. The challenge then lies in prioritizing infrastructure projects and in an adequate balance of new construction, maintenance and restitution to make limited budget available to countries of the region more efficient", explained Lian Allub, chief economist of the Directorate of Socioeconomic Research of CAF and co-author of RED2021.

In order to improve in this area, CAF has implemented a strategy to support integration logistics corridors and carries out an active intervention agenda in the matter, which includes the systematization of information on the corridor, the generation of roadmaps. and the prioritization of high-impact interventions in transport infrastructure, energy, logistics, telecommunications, territorial and socio-environmental development, focused on improving the provision of services and supporting the development of value chains. This strategy has been successfully applied in the North of Argentina (2018), in Ecuador (2019) and in Mexico (2021), resulting in the identification of investment projects for regional integration for more than USD 6.8 billion.

In Latin America, progress towards regional integration in this energy field has been uneven. In Central America, a significant step was taken with the creation of a regional electricity market and the completion of the physical interconnection between the six countries involved. South America, on the other hand, has only made progress in bilateral interconnections (more in the Andean subregion than in the Southern Cone), where the average use of interconnection capacity does not reach 10%, except between Ecuador and Colombia, where it reaches the 30%, and the use of common resources, such as binational hydroelectric dams (especially in the Southern Cone).

The reduction in trade costs worldwide promoted fragmentation and internationalization of production, driving creation and growth of global value chains. In RED2021, different possible actions are proposed to promote integration of production in central issues such as rules of origin, policies aimed at promoting direct foreign investment or special import regimes, among others.

"The integration processes require an institutional framework and state capacities for their design and implementation. These should align the interests of sectors that will benefit from these initiatives and, at the same time, serve to reduce costs and reconvert those activities that could face greater competition. For this, resources are required, but also coordination capacities between different state agencies, with the private sector and with other partner governments of these initiatives ", he pointed out. Sanguinetti.*L&E*



TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE BLUE ECONOMY IN PANAMA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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The Republic of Panama is a coastal country, with coasts on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and whose position and characteristics give it a strategic condition for politics, trade and global science. This geostrategic position, linked to the oceans, has marked the historical, political and social development of the country.

Panama has recognized, through various international instruments, that oceans constitute a common natural heritage of humanity and, consequently, is committed to their care, conservation of marine biodiversity and sustainable use of all its resources.

As an active member of the United Nations, it recognizes that climate change is a global problem, that impacts the oceans and that it requires efforts from the international community, for which it is committed to developing concrete adaptation and mitigation actions, as well as to the application of good environmental practices;

The coastline of Panama has a length of approximately 2,988 km, of which 1,700 km correspond to the Pacific slope.


The continental and insular platform is 25,000 km², of which 19,000 km² are on the Pacific slope.

Within the continental shelf 1,200 km² were distributed in approximately 1,5189 islands, islets and cays of volcanic or coral origin. Of this total, 495 units are located in the Pacific of Panama.

The largest island in Panamanian waters and in the entire American Pacific corresponds to Isla Coiba with 493 km².

Mangrove area 177,292 hectares (2012). 92.6% is in the Pacific.

National Ocean Policy (approval in process)



This policy has 10 specific objectives, but the following stand out:

- Generate sustainable development through the controlled exploitation of marine resources and carrying out activities in the sea, capable of generating wealth without affecting the quality of the environment.
- Position Panama as a worldwide benchmark for a nation committed to the Sustainable Development agenda, which, by virtue of its special geographical position and its historical marine legacy, is projected as an agent of change in oceanic matters.

The National Oceans Policy comprises 4 thematic axes:

1. The blue economy and logistics development: promote economic and social development based on policies that incorporate communities and encourage activities such as:

- **Conservation of wetlands.**
- **Tourism and marine sports.**

- **Fishing and controlled aquaculture, based on scientific evidence.**
- **Short sea shipping.**
- **Power Generators.**

2. As in other regional and global initiations:

- **Territorial development and the implementation of local policies.**
- **Promoting ocean culture and education.**

3. Science and technology and innovation:

- **Strengthening of infrastructures and equipment for research in marine and oceanographic sciences.**
- **Strengthen the capacity to do research, through postgraduate training (master's and doctorates) in areas of marine technology, oceanography, fisheries sciences, geology and marine biology.**

4. Biodiversity and Marine Resources.

5. Maritime Governance and Security.

National action plan marine litter (indefinite approval).

- Provide a set of actions to prevent and reduce marine litter in Panama from land and marine sources.


- Provide a guiding instrument that facilitates and extends cooperation between local communities, the private sector, the government and other relevant actors, to reduce marine litter and thus promote the protection, restoration, conservation and sustainable use of marine ecosystems and coastal areas.

- Promote research, technology development, innovation (R + D + i) and new methodologies to deal with marine litter.

- Raise awareness in society and increase environmental education activities, citizen action and the dissemination of the negative impacts of marine debris and the need to improve waste management.

Strategic axes:

- Legislation and governance.
- Awareness and education.
- Cleaning and restoration.
- Research, development and innovation.
- Financing / resources.



Solutions are and do exist, putting them into practice requires a real will from all stakeholders, including at the international level, including national and local governments, the private sector, civil society and individuals.

The world's economy, the well-being of human beings and the preservation of the environment are inseparable. The Earth belongs to everyone and today more than ever we are all part of the solution. *L&E*

Data obtained: Exhibition of Towards a sustainable blue economy in Panama: challenges and opportunities.

Psychological Capsule



SPORTS PSYCHOLOGY

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After the triumph of Panama against El Salvador, the technical director of the Panamanian team Thomas Christiansen, left the public stunned, with the following message:

"The Rosa issue, our psychologist, of course has helped, I think it is an important tool in professional football, having a psychologist, I would rather call it a mental coach, because a psychologist sounds a little more negative and the truth is that it is very good for the player, for the team, and for the national team."

In this interview, the technical director makes us understand that, to have a good game, we also need good mental health.

That is why in this capsule I talk about the branch of psychology that provides attention to sports and the difference between a psychologist and a coach.

Sports psychology.

What is sports psychology?

Sports psychology is another branch of psychology, like clinical psychology or forensic psychology, which studies "how, why and under what conditions athletes, coaches and spectators behave the way they do, as well as to investigate the mutual influence between physical activity and participation in Sport and psychophysical well-being, health and personal development "according to the Introduction to Sport Psychology manual.

In the most pragmatic aspect, sports psychologist Carlos Ramírez explains that sports psychology helps athletes to manage and control the psychological variables that intervene in the practice of their respective disciplines and that can affect their

performance and results.

What are those variables?

Some of those variables are the following:

1. Concentration

The ability to focus on a task or exercise without being distracted by anything or anyone from outside in order to get the best possible performance and not miss opportunities.

This, which is something important for any task, is especially so in sports competitions where the environment can be full of stimuli, and also when a race or match is your great opportunity to demonstrate your performance and deconcentration can ruin everything your work.

2. Attention

Closely related to the above: athletes need to be absolutely attentive to their activity, especially those of elite and high performance. Distractions can take their toll at the worst time.

3. The motivation

It is the central axis of any person's work, and even more so that of any athlete. Participation in the effort duly oriented towards well-established and delimited goals and objectives depends on it.

4. Self-confidence

Again, an important factor for anyone that is crucial to athletic performance. It is the reasonable belief that we are capable of achieving

our goals successfully.

5. Cope with pressure

The pressure to perform well, win, demonstrate one's abilities can negatively influence the above factors. That's why part of a sports psychologist's job is to help manage pressure and expectations so they don't become a problem..

How a sports psychologist works?

Each person is different and therefore it is difficult to establish a single method of action, but there are some procedures and tools that may be common.

To begin, an evaluation and diagnosis is carried out to determine in which areas the athlete needs to work with the help of the psychologist. They can include any of the aforementioned variables or any other.

From here, a planning of the intervention to be carried out is established and the tools to be used are considered. These are some of them:

1. Self-knowledge

It seems very simple, but it is not. It consists of learning about yourself, how you react to certain situations and why, in which moments you feel more secure and in which less, what leads you to lose focus and what strategies you can implement to solve it...

2. Relaxation

Just as it is important to maintain attention

and not lose concentration in crucial moments, it is important that athletes learn to relax both physically and psychologically so that pressure does not build up and end up causing problems, such as injuries, insomnia or lack of concentration.

3. Visualization

It is a technique that helps to visualize the goals and objectives and the way to go to achieve them. Thanks to it, motivation, concentration and confidence are exercised so that all psychological variables are aligned with the objective to be achieved and the steps that must be taken to achieve them.

Coaching vs Psychology

Now that we understand what a sports psychologist does, we will establish the differences between a coach and a psychologist.

The coach (that is, the Coaching professional) is an expert in communication skills who seeks that his client or coachee is able to discover his goals in life. The coach is in charge of accompanying the client and doing everything necessary so that these commitments and goals are achieved.

As we can see, Coaching is a technical methodology that applies concepts and theoretical bases of psychology to specific cases and adapts them to the client's requirements. However, the concept of Coaching has managed to establish itself as a professional work not necessarily linked to people who have thoroughly studied behavior and mental processes; that is, psychologists.

A psychologist, on the other hand, is someone who

has studied for years and in a rigorous and systematic way all the issues related to the human psyche, the development of skills, and the techniques and methods that allow a person to improve in their field and can achieve your personal and professional goals. In addition to their regulated university training, the psychologist must be part of an official professional association, thus accepting common ethical and deontological guidelines for all professionals in the sector, a fact that guarantees the client the seriousness and trust in the service that will be provided.

The psychologist has specific training on communication and interview techniques, as well as greater knowledge about psychological processes, a fact that allows him to be a better interpreter of the client's personality and of his psychosocial and / or work casuistry.

There are still more reasons to trust a psychologist rather than a coach without psychology studies. The psychologist has to his credit several methodological approaches and different techniques with which to treat the client, depending on his personality or her goals. She can advise and give guidelines for action, train different capacities, and ultimately can intervene directly on the client's needs.

Non-psychologist coaches follow a different methodology that is based on suggesting and enabling the client's life based on conversation and the Socratic method, but they cannot intervene directly since they are not empowered or have the resources to do so. *L&E*



Agenda Cultural

Por: Mariela de Sanjur
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THEATER

- The Curtain Studio Theater:
 - o There is a strike at Klaus' workshop from December 2 to 19, tickets 6981-8740.
 - ABA Theater:
 - o What happened last night? Until December 12.
 - o The Powerpuff Girls until December 5.
 - o Magic stories December 17, 18 and 19.
 - Pacific Theater: tickets in <https://teatropacific.net>
 - o Poli tells Hanukkah stories on December 1 and 2.
 - o Jack Frost, a Christmas adventure from November 27 to December 19.
 - La Estación Theater:
 - o Rudolph the reindeer who saved Christmas since December 5.
 - o Strings from December 13.
 - o Discordant on December 1.
 - Nacional Theater: tickets in www.verteatro.com y Panatickets
 - o Volver / Ricardo Velasquez, December 5 at 7:00 p.m.
 - o Everyone's story from December 17 to 19.
 - o A Magical Christmas, live the magic of Christmas, December 10, 11 and 12.
 - Gladys Vidal Theater:
 - o Tangerines from December 1 to 4.
 - Planta Baja Art Studio:
 - o As my boss fucks on Christmas from December 3 to 18, tickets in @plantabajapb
 - La Huaca Theater:
 - o Give me a hug, on December 1 and 2, tickets 6242-9996.
 - Anita Villalaz Theater:
 - o El Tamborilero on December 5, tickets @estrellitasinfantilespty
 - o Bad apprentice on December 11, tickets www.verteatro.com.
- Theater Digital Billboard: Tickets www.verteatro.com
- "The Writer of Epitaphs"
 - "Life's begins after a good cup of coffee"
 - "God creates them and the Devil puts them together."
 - "First Dates"
 - "The diva"
 - "Be careful with the tie"
 - "The Witch SINDY NERO"
 - "Dora and Prudencia"
 - "To bed with the thief"
 - "Fourteen"
- Pacific Theater digital billboard: tickets in <https://teatropacific.net>
- o "House in order"
 - o "# My Domestic Life"
 - o "No Forgiveness for Sins"

- o "Halloween with Polyband and Puppets"
- o "Tell Christmas Tales"
- o Livestream: "Artists by Artists 2021"

Virtual Billboard of La Estacion Theater:

- o Toxic Idyll, reservations: <https://forms.gle/5xdZP5BP5jcCoH7M8>
- o Husband affairs, reservations: <https://forms.gle/VZP6BG99QDZMSjZ39>

MUSEUMS, EXHIBITIONS AND FORUMS

- MAC until January 2022 will be able to visit three simultaneous exhibitions:
 - o Communicating vessels: intersections, edges and communications in the photographic image.
 - o My name is Legion: Portraits of a city that is many
 - o Brooke Alfaro: Thank God it wasn't worse.
- BIOMUSEUM:
 - o Biodiversity from home: temporary exhibitions in the Santiago Fernández Castro room and digital exhibitions on our social networks.
- Interoceanic Museum of Panama:
 - o Visit the new room "The route through sovereignty".
 - o Museum auditorium: Obra Cristo Quijote Treated from December 9 to 11.

CONCERTS AND PRESENTATIONS

- Intimate Flamenco by Anita Loynaz Casa Catedral, Casco Viejo on December 4. Panatickets tickets.
- Line Up-Boza in Concert, Anchors Mall Level 4, December 18 and 19, tickets at Panatickets.
- Salsa Pa Las Madres, Plaza Figali on December 7, tickets at Panatickets.
- Rubèn Blades & Roberto Delgado Intimo 2021,

Veranda Room, Sheraton Grand Panama Hotel on December 15, tickets at Panatickets.

- Ghosts of No Christmas, crazy stand at Murphy's on December 7, 9 and 10, tickets www.standlocos.com
- Grand bazaar and lighting of the Christmas tree, in the Plaza de la Ciudad del Saber on December 1.
- Pro Fondos Concert, pianist David Garcia's first international tour at the City of Knowledge Athenaeum on December 1, tickets www.mozart250.org/eventos

VARIOUS ACTIVITIES AND FESTIVITIES

- December 1: Teacher's Day.
- December 1: World AIDS Day.
- December 2: International Day for the Abolition of Slavery.
- December 3: Day of people with disabilities.
- December 5: Volunteer Day.
- December 8: Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, Mother's Day.
- December 10: Human Rights Day.
- December 11: UNICEF is created.
- December 12: Our Lady of Guadalupe.
- December 16: Ludwig Van Beethoven is born.
- December 20, 27 years since the United States Invasion of Panama.
- December 21: Winter Solstice.
- December 22: Foundation of the Portobelo National Park.
- December 24: Christmas Eve.
- Dec 24 to January 1: Hanukkah or Festival of Lights.
- December 25: Nativity of the Lord Jesus.
- December 27: Saint John, Apostle and Evangelist.
- December 28: Holy Innocents Day.
- December 30: Foundation of the Camino de Cruces National Park and Sagrada Familia Day.
- December 31: last day of the year. *L&E*

Alianzas alrededor del Mundo

Mitrani, Caballero, Rosso Alba, Francia, Ojam & Ruiz Moreno- ARGENTINA

Guevara & Gutiérrez S. C. Servicios Legales- BOLIVIA

Machado Associados Advogados e Consultores- BRASIL

DSN Consultants Inc- CANADÁ

Lewin & Wills Abogados- COLOMBIA

Rivera, Bolívar y Castañedas- PANAMÁ

Espinosa & Asociados- CHILE

Lawnetworker S.A. Asesores Legales- ECUADOR

Peter Byrne & Associates- ESTADOS UNIDOS

Machado Associados Advogados e Consultores- ESTADOS UNIDOS

Ortiz, Sosa, Ysusi y Cía., S.C.- MÉXICO

Estudio Rubio Leguía Normand & Asociados- PERU

Adsuar Muñoz Goyco Seda & Pérez-Ochoa, P.S.C.- PUERTO RICO

Pellerano & Herrera- REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA

Alvarado & Asociados- NICARAGUA

Torres, Plaz & Araujo- VENEZUELA

Facio & Cañas- COSTA RICA

